CAN IDEALS AND NORMS BE JUSTIFIED?

BY

A. CAMPBELL GARNETT

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

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Preface

A. Campbell Garnett is the seventh philosopher to give the Tully Cleon Knoles lectures in philosophy. Mr. Garnett's fourth lecture was delivered as part of the College commencement program before an audience which included the 1955 class of Knoles Fellows. The Knoles Fellows are junior college educators from the various academic disciplines who, like Chancellor Knoles, exhibit unusual intellectual curiosity which they seek to satisfy in a scholarly way.

All of Professor Garnett's lectures are examined at the Pacific Philosophy Institute, which meets at Lake Tahoe for four weeks, by nationally prominent philosophers whose views differ from his. During this period Mr. Garnett has the opportunity to expand, modify, and defend the positions he establishes in his lectures. This is done in the vernacular rather than with the technical vocabulary of the philosopher, thus making it possible for school teachers, lawyers, students, doctors, nurses, realtors, merchants, and persons from other walks of life who are without professional philosophical preparation, and who attend the Institute, to profit by the lectures.

Members of the 1955 class of Knoles Fellows are: George L. Andreini (Santa Rosa), Milton Black (Shasta), Evan Bailey Brockett (Santa Monica), James P. Collins (Fresno), Bruce Denison (Sierra), David G. Everall (City College of San Francisco), Donald H. Frantz, Jr. (Bakersfield), Irving Goleman (Stockton), Byron C. Guyer (East Contra Costa), Luella Hall (Hartnell), Paul R. Kurtz (Modesto), Andrew W. McClain (Reedley), Philipp Onstott (Sacramento), William L. Patty (Los Angeles City College), and Glenn Van Doren (Yuba).

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Extensive quotations have been made from Dewey and Tuft's **Ethics** with the kind permission of Henry Holt and Company, Inc.

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Stockton, California
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THE CONCEPTS OF IDEAL AND NORM

CONSIDERING the vast differences in culture and politics in the world today it is surprising that there is such a large agreement on practical ethical questions which enabled the representatives of so many different countries to agree to the Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations. They have not put it into practice, but that only renders their agreement on what ought to be done the more remarkable. It indicates that there is some common basis in thought or experience on which these judgments were made. Yet the attempts to explicate that basis as a philosophy of morals are very far from agreement. We can agree on what ought to be done much more easily than we can agree as to reasons why we ought to do it. Yet to make further progress in agreement as to what ought to be done we need to find agreement as to the sort of reasons that should be given for moral decisions. It should not be impossible to create this agreement by exploring our way into the real reasons for those decisions on which we agree. This is the task of moral philosophy and, difficult as it is, we must persist with it.

Yet in spite of this need for moral philosophy, there have been few times in history when moral philosophers were less sure of themselves. This, however, is not necessarily a reason for despair. It indicates greater critical awareness of the problems than has

been attained before, and to see the real problems clearly is the first step necessary to their solution. So let us begin by facing up to the basic problems as they are seen today.

Contemporary Ethical Criticism and Scepticism

One of the factors which has both clarified ethical thinking and increased contemporary scepticism concerning traditional solutions of basic ethical questions is modern studies in anthropology. These have emphasized both the vast differences in moral ideas in different primitive cultures and also the way in which moral judgments are affected by the particular scale of values traditionally predominating within a culture. By the accidents of historical cultural contacts, by the effects of economic conditions, by the influence of individuals of special genius, and in other ways often undiscoverable, one people has come to place a special value on one kind of activity and another upon another, and the effects are stamped deep upon their traditions of moral judgment. One people places its special valuation upon military prowess, another upon skill and leadership in the performance of ritual or other arts, another upon the accumulation of certain kinds of property for purposes of ostentation rather than utility, another upon success in other types of competition. The results affect the whole moral outlook and tone of their culture to such an extent that no judgment upon the conduct of any individual, or the validity of any institution, can be made without taking into consideration the whole cultural configuration.

This relativity of all reasonable moral judgment to cultural tradition is one of the lessons which contemporary anthropologists

have most thoroughly learned and have most vigorously impressed upon us. Ruth Benedict, for example, in *Patterns of Culture*, impresses this lesson by expounding and contrasting the egoistic scale of values of the Dobu with the Apollonian ideals of the Zuni and the Dionysian valuation of the Kwakiutl. The terms "Apollonian" and "Dionysian" are taken from two contrasting phases of Greek culture, the one emphasizing the value of rationality, harmony, moderation and proportion, the other that of vitality, self-expression and self-assertion. The Greek culture was formed of a mingling of these two ideals, which gave it its balance, and its dynamic. In our own culture we shall find these two ideals mingled with a third, that of Christianity. In the primitive cultures Dr. Benedict selects for study, one ideal alone is dominant. The moral which the anthropologist would have us draw from these studies is plainly stated in a note introduced at the beginning of the *Pelican Books* edition. It is "that cultures (our own included) cannot be compared on an ethical basis, but simply as coexisting and equally valid patterns of life."

This, however, is an extreme conclusion that goes far beyond the evidence. It is one thing to say the conduct of the individual must be judged in the light of the social institutions of his people, and those institutions in the light of their history and circumstances. It is quite another to say that the right or wrong of individual conduct is to be judged solely by its conformity to social institutions and that social institutions are not subject to ethical criticism at all. Such a conclusion does not by any means follow from the fact that the ideals of one people are dominantly Apollonian, those of another Dionysian and another egoistic. It only raises the further

question whether there is any ethical criterion whereby we can judge the value or validity of Apollonian, Dionysian, egoistic or other ideals in the shaping of a culture and its institutions.

One must refrain from the temptation to say that, of course, these cultures may be ethically judged by their social utility, for that is simply to assert one's own preference for the Utilitarian ideal. Utilitarianism asserts that institutions must be judged by their tendency to promote human happiness and distribute it widely and equally, but supporters of other ideals question whether happiness should be preferred to Apollonian harmony or Dionysian self-expression, and whether an equalitarian distribution of happiness to the many ought to be preferred to the special cultivation of Apollonian or Dionysian values among the few. To assert the Utilitarian standpoint begs the questions at issue here. And it offers no solution to the other question as to how far the rights, values or happiness of the people of the present may justly be sacrificed to promote a Utopia to be realized in the future.

It is the clear recognition of these difficulties that has led to the two sceptical reactions common in contemporary ethical thinking. One is the radical relativism we have already mentioned, which would say that the only meaning of statements of moral right and wrong is their application *within* a particular culture to describe the agreement or disagreement of actions with the moral standards set by that culture. This means that in matters of ethics tradition is king. The other reaction, rejecting this exaltation of tradition to an ethical dictatorship, denies that ethical terms have any *cognitive* meaning. "Right," "wrong," "good," "bad," "justice," "duty," "ought," and all other *normative* terms are said to be simply

ways of expressing emotions, wishes, requests, demands, commands, and so forth. An ethical sentence, on this view, is never a statement of a truth or a fact, though it may have that sort of grammatical form. It is simply an expressive or persuasive, not an informative, use of language. Moral ideals and norms may be analyzed and described, but they are only formulations of the desires and demands of the person, or group of persons, who hold and uphold them.

The Meaning of "Ought"

This brings us to what is probably the most basic question in ethical theory—that of the meaning of the word "ought" in the sense in which it is used to point to a moral obligation or duty, or to state an ideal of what, from the ethical standpoint, ought to be. This ethical sense of the word "ought" needs to be distinguished from several other senses in which the word is used. One of these is the logical use in which we say that from certain facts or arguments a certain conclusion ought to be drawn, or that the answer found to a certain mathematical problem ought to be so and so. A second use is the legal, in which, from the prescriptions of law or custom, we directly deduce that something ought or ought not to be done. A third use is the prudential, in which we say that to attain a certain end certain means ought to be adopted, these being the only means possible or the most efficient; or we say that a certain end should be preferred to others because it fits better in the total pattern of that person's ends. A fourth is the aesthetic, in which we use the term to state requirements of beauty. Fifth is the sense with which we are here concerned, in which the term is used to state an ethical requirement.

Now there is not much danger of confusing the ethical "ought" with the logical or aesthetic, but there sometimes is some question about its distinction from the legal and prudential uses. It will therefore be well to take a clear example of an ethical use of "ought" to show that, in the common understanding of it, something is intended that is different from the intention of these other uses.

Take the following case. A young man inherits from a relative a business which is piling up a fortune selling a certain patent medicine. He is a pharmacist and when he is given the secret formula he sees that it is quite useless and slightly injurious. It has made its reputation by clever advertising and its pleasantly stimulating effect. The sale is legal, though obviously fraudulent to one who knows the effects of the formula. But it is very profitable.

In such a case, there is no doubt many people would say that the young man ought, on moral grounds, to discontinue the manufacture and sale of this particular medicine. It is clear, however, that the "ought" used here is not the legal, for there is no law or custom which would require him to do so. Neither is it the prudential "ought." It is not being asserted that his present ends would be more effectively served, or his total preferences better fitted, by making the financial sacrifice and ceasing to sell a product which he knows to be a fraud on a gullible public. What is meant is that, even if his preferences put the making of money above all other ends, and if this fraudulent sale is the most effective way he has of attaining that end, and if none of his other present desires is thereby frustrated, he still ought not to continue the fraud.

The question raised by the non-cognitivists in ethical theory is whether the "ought," in this distinctly ethical sense, is being used to state a fact. They can find no fact which it states. It does not state that there is a law or custom requiring the cessation of such business. It does not state that it would somehow serve the young man's own special interests best to discontinue such sales. It is independent of the particular form of his own interests. We may say that the moral "ought" says what his interests ought to be, or that it explicates what a moral rule requires; but that, as an attempt to define the moral ought, simply goes round in a circle. Here is the difficulty so pointedly raised by the non-cognitivist critics of ethical theory. If ethical utterances utter truths, then they utter truths about what? If moral rules state requirements as to conduct, then *what is it* that requires this sort of conduct? Failing to find a satisfactory answer in traditional ethical theories, the non-cognitivist says we must conclude that ethical utterances are not truths about anything. They express emotions, wishes, demands; they exert pressures and exercise persuasion.

The Concepts of Norm and Ideal

We can best approach the problem of the nature of a moral law by first looking carefully at the more general concepts of law and norm. A law is a rule or uniformity in the course of events, and it is important for our purposes to distinguish laws of three kinds. First there are natural or scientific laws. These are the unbroken uniformities of specific kinds of event as found in nature. Secondly, there are the laws of institutions, such as the state. These are certain uniformities of behavior required by human social or-

ganizations. They are more or less deliberately established and supported by sanctions. They are rules to which certain people are required to conform or suffer certain consequences. But they are not absolute uniformities like the laws of nature. Thirdly there are norms. These are uniformities of function or behavior to which a certain kind of living organism needs to conform in order to fulfill the potentialities of its species. The most obvious examples are what we commonly call the laws of health. If a human body is to fulfill all its potentialities then there are certain rules of behavior to which its owner must conform and certain ways in which its organs must function. These rules, laws, or norms depend upon natural laws, but they are not absolute uniformities. They can be broken. If they are broken, the organism suffers in some way, but the suffering is not a sanction deliberately imposed. It is a natural consequence of the non-normal behavior or functioning of the organism.

It is very difficult to be sure exactly what the laws or norms of health are, but if the human body is a part of the order of nature, with definite and limited potentialities of development and endurance, and with definite conditions required for such development, then there certainly are such norms. It is true that they will have to be stated with a certain flexibility because of individual differences, but in so far as man is a distinct species with characteristics common to the species there will be laws of health common to all mankind. There will also, because of individual differences, be some distinctive individual requirements for full development of potentialities, but these cannot be called laws or norms except as they can be shown to be special instances of general requirements

common to the species. The laws or norms of physical health are the general or common modes of behavior and organic functioning required for full realization of the potentialities resident in the human species as a type of living organism.

The concept of the perfect or full realization of these potentialities is, of course, a concept of an ideal limit, yet it is not an arbitrary one. The limit is fixed by the laws of nature and the essential constitution of the human species. The perfection of health is probably something that no one has ever maintained and could never be determined. But there is no doubt whatever that certain conditions constitute decisive departures from it. They are bad health, and we know it, and we know their causes, and can state the laws or norms the breaking of which produces this bad health. We do not need to have an exact concept of what the perfect ideal would be in order to be able to recognize approximations to it and important departures from it, and to state broadly, and in some instances very definitely, the laws or norms of behavior and organic functioning which must be observed to maintain an approximation to the ideal.

This discussion should serve to clarify and illustrate the concepts of norm and ideal (or perfection) as involved in talk about physical health. It is clear that in this realm of discourse the concepts are thoroughly empirical and sufficiently clear for important practical use in human intercourse. It is also clear that these concepts can be transferred from the realm of discourse of physical health to that of any other phase of organic life where there are possibilities and limits of continuity and development which are conditioned by the laws of nature. We can speak in the same way

of the norms of mental life, of the ideal perfection and the norms of intellectual development and of the development of any phase of aesthetic activity. And here, too, the concepts are thoroughly empirical and sufficiently clear for important practical use in human intercourse. The concept of an ideal perfection of the intellectual life may be much vaguer than that of physical health, but we are nevertheless able to recognize approximations to it and decisive departures from it and can state some of the norms concerned in its attainment. The concepts of an ideal perfection of the aesthetic life, and of aesthetic norms, it must be admitted, are vaguer still and seem to need clarification by making many distinctions among forms of aesthetic activity to which we are not commonly accustomed. But the concepts are just as empirical as those regarding physical health and intellectual development, and a study of the conditions of approximation to the ideal has established many well verified norms in nearly every department of aesthetic activity.

The problem we have to face is whether we can, in the same empirical fashion, frame an ideal of the moral life? If we can, then moral norms will be empirically discoverable rules of behavior, common to the human species, adherence to which is required by natural laws of the human psyche for the realization of the full potentialities, the perfecting, of a certain empirically describable phase of life. Thus the moral "ought" would mean "required as a condition of the perfection of this phase of life." But *what* phase of life is it, the perfecting of which would constitute *moral* perfection? And what is required for the perfecting, or fulfillment, of its potentialities? Can the notion of moral perfection be defined in empirical, i.e., in psychological terms, so that we can scientifi-

cally discover and demonstrate the norms requisite to its attainment and maintenance, or at least requisite to an approximation to it?

The first step forward in answer to this question we can take with confidence. The phase of life with which ethical utterances are concerned is that of volition, or choice. That which is referred to as morally right or wrong in us is not our knowledge, or our reasoning processes, or our states of feeling, but our decisions and efforts. A morally perfect man would be one whose decisions or choices were always morally right and his efforts appropriate to them; and he would still be morally perfect if his efforts were not successful and the results did not make him happy. Our question, therefore, is whether there is any sense in which, apart from the correctness of the intellectual interpretation of facts upon which choice is based, the decision or choice itself may still be right or wrong? Are there any norms, common to the human species, to which choices must conform in order that the volitional life of a human being may realize its full potentialities, i.e., attain and maintain perfection?

If such norms can be found it will not immediately follow that they are the moral norms we seek, even though they are norms of the volitional life, and moral norms, if there are such, must also be norms of the volitional life. It might be the case that the perfection of the volitional life, in the sense of which we have been speaking, is not the same as the perfection of the volitional life which moralists call moral perfection. That can only be determined by a careful study and comparison of both. This we will undertake, at the most crucial points of comparison, in future

lectures. An exhaustive study would be endless, but we can, I hope, confirm the identification in its main outlines.

The Perfection of the Volitional Life

First we should make clear what is meant by the perfection of the volitional life in the sense of which we have been speaking. The volitional life is the life of impulse, which presents us with ends, and the purposively directed effort to achieve some of those ends. Purposively directed effort is only directed to some of the ends towards which impulse directs attention because, as we have pointed out, some of these ends are found incompatible with each other, and a selection has to be made. The volitional life thus has two aspects—those of impulsive expression and selective control. It has definite *potentialities* with definite *limitations* determined by the psycho-physical structure and common to every human being with a normally developed psychophysical structure. These potentialities, as thus determined and limited, constitute what may be called the "full potentialities" of the volitional life of man. But, because of these natural limitations the full potentialities cannot be realized without intelligent selective control. Realization of the full potentialities in this sense would constitute the "perfection" of the volitional life—its "ideal" form—in the sense of which we have been speaking.

The realization of these potentialities depends in large part on factors external to the volitional structure and its functioning, e.g., on the intelligence and physical strength of the individual and on factors in his physical and social environment. But it also depends on the actual *functioning* of the volitional life, i.e., on the

choices made and the effort put forth when it becomes necessary to select and prefer the pursuit of one end rather than another, or to choose one means rather than another because of its greater compatibility with other ends. It is possible to point to choices which have ~~stultified~~ the development of the volitional life and to others which have contributed to its development. A study of these can certainly lead to the framing of some generalizations stating laws of development of the volitional life and useful guiding principles for the making of choices. But it is a further question whether these useful guiding principles express, or approximate to, a statement of norms of choice, adherence to which is requisite ~~to~~ for a full realization of the ideal.

In that full realization or perfection of the volitional life every impulse in the life of man would find expression and every end would find attainment so far as these impulses and ends are compatible with each other. This is what is meant by the full realization of the potentialities of personality, and for this reason ethical theories which have taken this ideal as the key to the moral life have commonly been called "self-realization" theories.

This name, however, has certain dangers, ~~which we shall need to note~~. It suggests that the self is the goal of the moral life, which ~~we shall see to be~~ a mistake. And it tends to place the emphasis on the free expression of the life of impulse rather than on the development of the capacity for integration and control of impulse. Fortunately, most so-called "self-realization" theories have not made the latter mistake, though many have made the former. Therefore we must make it clear that the term "self-realization" does not imply that the ideal is to be reached by the self taking

its own perfection as its deliberate goal, and also that the term contains room for recognition that the development of the capacity for wise choice and controlled effort is itself a most important feature of the potentialities which the perfect self must realize.

Because of mutual incompatibility, some impulses have to be restrained and some ends must remain unattained. The ideal of perfection or full realization of potentialities can only mean that this should be done with the minimum of loss. To attain it, restraint would have to be placed on those impulses, the too free expression of which would tend to stultify the development of other impulses (or interests) with more permanent, constant, and richer possibilities. Encouragement would have to be given to those impulses or interests (for spontaneous interest is an impulse) which begin slowly and weakly but have rich possibilities of development. Every decision would have to maintain both the internal harmony and the greatest possible freedom of expression, and every such decision would call for wisdom. It should therefore be made specifically clear that the ideal of the full realization or perfection of the volitional life must contain this second feature—the full development of the capacity for selective control among impulsively generated ends and its exercise in the maintenance of internal harmony of purposive activity. This feature of the ideal we may briefly refer to as that of rational self-control.

These two features of the ideal are not complete, however, without a third, which also needs explicit mention. The individual human being is not complete in himself. He is a part of society and his volitional life is interwoven with that of the community.

Man is never thought of as an ethical being apart from this relationship. Nor can he be adequately thought of in naturalistic terms as a living organism without it. The ideal of the full realization or perfection of his volitional life must therefore include that of the fulfillment of his potentialities as a social being.

It is at this point that the naturalistic analysis of the ideal makes connection with the element that is most prominent in ethical thinking, i.e., that of the duties of the individual to society. To fulfill his potentialities as a social being the individual must be integrated with his society. It is not only necessary that the ends generated by his impulsive life should be harmonized with each other; they must also, in certain fundamental ways, be in harmony with those of the community. Conflict with the community involves him in conflict within himself, for his impulsive life is too much bound up with that of the community for him to enter into conflict with it and yet maintain an easy peace within himself. He cannot fulfill his social being without harmonious relations with a harmonious society. Yet the conflicts within society, and his own conflicts with its members, are such that complete fulfillment of the ideal at this point is always impossible. To maintain the greatest possible harmony and freedom of expression within himself the man of ethical wisdom must seek the reconciliation of his own volitional life with that of his fellows at the deepest and most enduring levels of human motivation. Usually this ~~will~~ means that he must conform to what his society regards as the most essential rules of moral conduct, but ~~it will not necessarily do so~~. Sometimes it ~~will~~ requires that he ~~shall~~ break through those rules to be true to value insights of his own. Yet even then the values

with which he is concerned will nearly always have social implications.

At this point we should remember what has been said about a norm. A norm is not to be identified with the requirement of the ideal in a particular situation. It is a uniformity of function or behavior to which a certain kind of living organism needs to conform in order to fulfill the potentialities implicit in members of its species. The norms of the volitional life of man, if there are any, must therefore be those uniform principles of selection or preference among impulses and their ends which, owing to the essential and common structure of the human organism, every person must adhere to in order to realize the full potentialities of his volitional life. Such norms, if they can be found, must be much broader and more basic than the laws and customs of any society. And if these norms are identified with the moral norms they must be regarded as underlying the traditional moral rules of every society and constituting a basis for criticism of them. The question therefore is whether this identification can be justified.

Natural Perfection and Moral Experience

In facing this question we must keep clearly in mind both the concept of a norm and the three main features of what we may call the *ideal of natural perfection.* These features, as we have seen, are (1) *Fulfillment of potentialities,* in the sense that every impulse would find expression and every end find attainment, so far as these impulses and ends are compatible with each other. (2) *Rational self-control,* in the sense of a full development of the capacity for selective control among impulsively generated ends,

and its exercise in the maintenance of internal harmony and full expression of purposive activity. (3) *Social integration,* in the manner and to the extent required for fulfillment of man's potentialities as a social being. This, then, is the ideal in its broad outline. The norms relevant to it will be such rules or uniformities of conduct as are required by the psychophysical constitution of the human species in order that the ideal may be attained.

Does the ideal of natural perfection, thus broadly outlined, coincide with a similarly broad concept of the moral ideal? The question is not an easy one to answer, for the moral ideal is always vague and somewhat confused. It has not been arrived at by the process of rational analysis which we have used to outline the naturalistic ideal. Its features have been stamped into our consciousness by a host of impressions of occasions in which ethical terms are used and the distinctive feeling tones of moral experience are felt. Its most prominent elements are the explicit norms most commonly emphasized in our society and the feelings of approval and disapproval associated with them. It is these feelings and norms that come to our minds most readily as determining the meaning of the word "ought" when we ask ourselves what we mean by it. Yet a little reflection soon shows that these elements of meaning in the foreground of our minds when we think in ethical terms do not constitute their basic and accurate meaning. An unsophisticated person, asked what is the meaning of "duty" is apt to say "What is required by law," or "What is required by your conscience," but a little thought and questioning soon makes him dissatisfied with these answers, though he may well continue to regard them as partial truths.

The self-realization theory in ethics should not be interpreted as saying that people always have the ideal of natural perfection clearly in mind when they speak of moral perfection. It should be understood, rather, as making two claims. (1) That it offers the basic causal explanation of the moral experience. (2) That it offers semantic elucidation of basic ethical terms. These two achievements go together.

The semantic elucidation of ethical terms offered by the self-realization theory is that attributed by Plato to Socrates, that justice (or righteousness) is the health of the soul. In modern terms we may state this as meaning that *righteousness is integrity, unity, or wholeness in the structure of intentional activity, functioning in such a way as tends to realize its completest possible development.* Unrighteousness, on the other hand, is disintegration of intentional activity such as tends to stultify its completest possible development. In more popular terms, it is a sickness of the soul, a disease of the spiritual life, a disorder in the structure and functioning of the highest part of man, the system of his intelligent purposes, his rational-volitional being.

Moral insight, on this view, is an insight into the form of the purposive volitional life (the structure and functioning of intentional activity) when it is most wholesome, i.e., functioning with maximum internal harmony, freedom and growth. The feeling for moral values and the sense of guilt are the feelings associated with the health and sickness of the soul in the sense described. Like the feelings of physical sickness and health they are symptoms probably indicating an internal condition of orderly or disorderly

functioning, but are unsafe guides as to what the condition actually is. In both cases a man may be really sick and not feel it; and he may make himself feel sick merely by believing himself sick. At the same time the feeling states of conscience are just as basic to the concepts of moral well- and ill-being as the bodily feelings are to those of physical health and sickness. Ordinary moral judgments express partial and often distorted understanding of the norms of spiritual health, guided chiefly by the feelings of conscience, and formulated in interaction with the moral judgments of the rest of the community.

The causal explanation of moral experience offered by the self-realization theory is thus in line with its semantic elucidation of ethical terms. The basic moral experience (the sense of duty or obligation) it interprets as a constraint felt within the volitional experience — the constraint exercised upon any particular volitional tendency by its relation to the total structure of intentional activity of which it is a part; in particular, by the need of that structure to maintain its integrity or harmony in the interests of full and free expression, of coordinated growth. When an act that would be counter to that need is contemplated or reflected upon, the constraint of the need upon it tends to be felt, vaguely or clearly, and the contrariness of the action tends to be discerned, also vaguely or clearly, as a unique kind of wrongness — in intentional activity. The ideal of righteousness thus takes form as that of a freedom from such wrongness. The terms "right" and "wrong," "ought" and "ought not," acquire their basic ethical meaning from a reference to the form or relation of inner integrity or harmony that thus tends to be discerned, together with the feelings of in-

ward satisfaction and dissatisfaction with the self uniquely associated with this condition of inner harmony or disharmony.

The nature of this state of inner integrity, harmony, volitional wholeness, or spiritual health, thus vaguely felt and partially seen, is, however, much too complex for a clear idea of it to be formed. The same is, of course, also true of the actual nature of physical health. Yet, without clarity of the concept, and with little or no scientific understanding of what is involved in it, human beings become strongly convinced that there is a very important difference between being well and being ill, whether in "body" or in "soul." In both cases attempts at description of the condition, or definition of the concepts that refer to it, tend to concentrate upon what appear to be its most striking symptoms. Thus physical ill is defined in terms of pain, feebleness and deformity; and spiritual ill in terms of the sense of guilt, lack of self-control, and nonconformity with traditional rules. Yet in both cases definitions in these terms are forced to give way under criticism, which brings up the cases they do not fit but where the terms are yet seen to be appropriate.

The claim of the self-realization theory in ethics is that the only definitions of ethical terms that retain any plausibility under such criticism are those framed in terms referring to the ideal of natural perfection. This means that when people speak of moral perfection, or use "ought" or its synonyms in the ethical sense, they have, in the back of their minds at least, a concept of the structure and functioning of intentional activity approximating to what we have called the ideal of natural perfection; further, that a critical clarification of what they really intend to say tends to bring this ideal clearly into consciousness, and that, when the

ideal of natural perfection is adequately elucidated and the ideals of the moral consciousness critically clarified, the moral consciousness tends to have its demands satisfied by the naturalistic ideal and its norms.

If this claim is to be defended then the content of the ideal of natural perfection must be carefully examined. Its implications in the framing of norms must be explicated with equal care. The theory can only hope to win acceptance by showing that the ideal of personality and norms of conduct thus developed accord with those developed by an equally careful and critical examination of those ethical ideals and norms which have won a wide consensus of endorsement in the history of ethical thinking.

THE APOLLONIAN IDEAL

In the poetry and philosophy of Greece we can trace an interesting series of changes in the moral ideal. At every stage we find the three features which we have distinguished as characterizing the ideal of natural perfection, i.e., fulfillment of potentialities, rational self-control and social integration. But the emphasis varies and the norms which the ideal is believed to imply undergo change. These variations of ideals and norms are due chiefly to changing social conditions of those who formulate the ideal. This is as we should expect if the explicit form of the moral ideal is determined, as the self-realization theory suggests, by the constraining needs of natural perfection making themselves felt in the volitional life as it deals with changing social conditions.

The Clash of Ideals in Ancient Greece

Ethical discourse in the Homeric poems is dominated by the concepts of *areté, aidos* and *nemesis. Areté,* which later came to mean goodness or excellence of any kind, and is often translated "virtue," refers in Homer to "a combination of proud and courtly morality with warlike valor."[1] It is the excellence of the true nobleman and is beyond the attainment of ordinary men. If a man of noble birth should be captured and enslaved he loses half his *arete.*

1. Werner Jaeger, **Paideia,** tr. G. Highec (Oxford: Blackwell and Mott, 1939), p. 3.

In the latest of the Homeric poems it is used for moral or spiritual qualities, but in the earlier simply for the valor, strength and skill of the warrior or athlete.[2] The possessor of *areté* is the object of *aidos* (reverence, respect, the sense of modesty, bashfulness, shame). *Arete'* is the self-disciplined power of the leader of men. It requires of him high standards. His own sense of the duty to maintain those standards is his own *aidos,* his respect for the ideal of the highest and fullest manhood. Toward those who fail in the demands of *areté,* or who lack a true respect, or *aidos,* for it, he feels the contrary passion of *nemesis* (moral indignation and resentment). *Nemesis* is felt also toward any violation of law or custom.

Women of noble families may also possess *areté.* For them it consists chiefly in physical beauty, but also includes prudence, chastity and good housekeeping.[3]

The term *diké* (right, due, custom, law) has relatively small place in Homer, though a breach of *diké* is, of course, an occasion of *nemesis* and contrary to true *areté.* Homer usually refers to law and justice by the term *themis,* which refers more specifically to the institutions of custom and the prescriptions of kings and feudal lords. *Diké* is a term of obscure origin, though probably its original sense was "custom."[4] "The meaning of *themis,*" says Werner Jaeger, "is confined rather to the *authority* of justice, . . . while *diké* means the legal enforcibility of justice." It means "the due share which each man can rightly claim."[5] It also contained the

2. Ibid., p. 4.
3. Ibid., p. 21.
4. Liddell and Scott's Greek Lexicon.
5. Op. Cit., p. 101.

meaning of *equality* in the administration of law, as in the rule of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.[6]

Insistence upon the importance of *diké* comes in the post-Homeric period, with the passing of the power of kings and feudal lords in the development of the Greek city state. In these states there arose the struggle for equality on the part of the common man. Trade had raised up a merchant class to vie with the nobility in wealth and influence. Pressure of population had created a landless class of freemen, some of whom were forced into slavery for debt. These new problems of relations within the community brought about a reassessment of values. Early in the eighth century B. C. the voice of Hesiod was raised to protest against breaches of *diké* (right and justice in the legal sense) in the administration of the laws. In his poems he personified Diké as the daughter of Zeus. He distinguished a false *diké,* of what he charged were corrupted customs enforced by the rulers of his day, from the true *diké* upheld by Zeus himself.

From the time of Hesiod we find that a new concept of the ideal man begins to shape itself in Greece—the ideal of the just man—and a new term is coined for the ideal characteristic thus envisioned—the word *dikaiosyné,* justice, in the broad sense synonymous with "righteousness." The Greek language had long had words for the particular negative concepts of wrongdoing—murder, theft, adultery, etc.; but it had no word for the positive concept of the loyal keeping of the law until the Greek Middle Ages (between Homer and the Classical period) when the politics of the

6. Ibid., p. 101.

new city states, with the problems raised by class struggles, brought about the formulation of written codes of law. As the struggle placed first one group and then another in ascendancy everyone in turn was forced to appeal to the ideal of a law that was equal and fair for all. The need of the times was for a new type of leader and it issued in the growth of a new concept of the ideal man. Not the men of noble blood, courtly manners, strength and courage — the aristocratic ideal — but the man of justice, who kept the law and administered it truly. *Areté* changed its meaning. It came to embody a more general excellence, and particularly that of justice, or righteousness, *dikaiosyné*.

This ideal found its concrete embodiment in the personality and work of Solon at the beginning of the sixth century B. C. The class struggle at Athens had reached such a crisis of intensity that the aristocratic rulers realized that they must surrender control or be overwhelmed in violent and bloody revolution. They therefore gave dictatorial powers to a wise and liberal member of their own class to recast their constitution and laws. This man was Solon. His reforms were far-reaching but not revolutionary. He refused to redistribute the land but cancelled all debts and freed those enslaved for debt. He created a representative government, enfranchising all who held Athenian citizenship. He then handed over the reins of power to the new constitutional democracy and retired to put in the form of verse, for the teaching of future generations, the moral and political philosophy which had inspired and guided his reforms. Like Hesiod he expresses faith in the power of Diké. For him it is an inseparable part of the divine world-order. The just man alone is worthy of honor, and by justice

alone can the individual or the state continue to prosper. And justice is the rule of law which deals impartially with the affairs of men, as citizens, each within his own community.

The paths of constitutional government at Athens, and in other Greek democracies established on a similar pattern, did not, however, run smooth. Sometimes they collapsed into the dictatorship of demagogues. Sometimes they broke out in extremes of mob rule. Sometimes they were overthrown by reactionary parties of the right. The ideal of justice, which Solon had taught and embodied, was honored more with lip service than actual practice. In reaction against these conditions poets arose, a century after Solon, such as Theognis (of Megara) and Pindar (of Thebes), to praise the old *diké* (law or right), and the old *areté* (excellence or virtue), of the aristocracy. On the other hand, Aeschylus (of Athens) praised the wisdom of Solon and attributed the spirit which had given victory over the Persians to the ideals of freedom and justice he had put into the hearts of the people and the laws of the state.

In the same period the Sophists, the teachers of Greek youth, began to question the concept of justice. Is it just a matter of custom, of convention, to change with the times, or is it rooted in the nature of man, in the order of the universe and the law of the gods? The Sophists knew that the ideal of *areté* had changed with the times. There were some, like Protagoras, who defended the change, saying "Man is the measure of all things" (i.e., all standards are man made), but the standard of justice is the standard of wise men. There were others, like Thrasymachus, who defended change without standards, saying all standards and all laws, all

diké and *dikaiosyné*, all that is called "justice," consists simply of rules laid down by those in power and shaped to suit their own interests. "Justice is the interest of the stronger." Others, such as Antiphon,[7] in his essay on *Truth*, rejected the authority of all human law as contrary to human nature, for the natural law of human behavior is for each to seek his own pleasure; the only compulsion in the laws of a state is the threat of punishment and this ceases to exist if there is no chance of the law-breaker being found out. Less radical, but more reactionary, was the doctrine which Plato, in the *Gorgias*, puts into the mouth of the aristocrat Callicles. The ideal of justice is contrary to nature. Men are by nature unequal. The only right that is according to nature is the right of the strong to rule and exploit the weak. It is a false and degenerate education that foists upon the vigorous and strong in their youth the ideas that justice and equality are honorable, thus taming the young lions. By the law of nature, might is right. "He who would truly live ought to allow his desires to wax to the uttermost, and not to chastise them; but when they have grown to the greatest he should have courage and intelligence to minister to them and to satisfy all his longings. And this I affirm to be natural justice and nobility."

It must not be thought that these protests of radical sophists, and of reactionary poets, sophists and aristocrats, were devoid of moral idealism. They expressed moral idealism of a different kind from the ideals of equity and impartiality preached by Hesiod and Solon. They expressed feelings of *nemesis* (of moral indignation) against the vulgarity, disorder and mob tyranny perpetrated by a

7. Cf. Werner Jaeger, **Paideia**, pp. 324-7.

populace that gave lip-service to "equality" and "righteousness." They expressed *aidos* (reverence) for the vigorous individuality, the courage and the pride of superior power, of an earlier day. They idealized a freedom and fulness of self-expression toward which the new intellectual criticism of the trammels of the past pointed the way.

Thus in all these different ideals we find simply different emphases upon the characters that enter into the natural perfection of the volitional life. The ancient *areté* was an ideal framed by the upper class. It emphasized fulfillment of potentialities, tempered by the self-control involved in the courage which the times required for such fulfillment, and affected by the conditions of social integration only so far as it concerned relations to their own class. The ideal of justice of the common man in the city state emphasized the equalitarian social integration and self-control needed if fulfillment of potentialities were to be open to the ordinary citizen. The reactionaries and radicals of the later period, finding fulfillment of their own potentialities restricted by equalitarian laws, reacted against those restrictions to seek fulfillment either by a return to the ancient ideal or by a radical loosening of bonds to make the individual a law unto himself.

Ideals of the Classical Moralists

It is against this background that Plato presents the figure of Socrates preaching that "Justice (righteousness, *dikaiosyné*) is the health of the soul." Here the Apollonian ideal of fulfillment through inner harmony and order attains at last the status of a self-conscious philosophy to support the Apollonian faith of Solon

against the threat of a Dionysian revival by the radicals and reactionaries. The concept of the health of the soul is the concept of the natural perfection, the completeness, the wholeness, the harmonious fulfillment, of the volitional life. The emphasis, however, is upon inward peace, harmony, the strength that comes through integrity, the heights that can be reached only by the laying of a firm foundation. The fulfillment desired is that of the life of the intellect, rather than of the passions.

The question which Socrates is required to answer is a double one. (1) Why should a man concern himself to be righteous instead of giving full freedom to his strongest desires? (2) In what does righteousness consist? The answer to the first expresses Socrates' own basic conviction. Man should be righteous because righteousness is the greatest of goods, the condition of all human well-being; it is the health of the soul; and unrighteousness is a canker and a chaos in the soul that destroys all true happiness. The answer to the second question goes to the heart of the Socratic-Platonic philosophy. It rejects the identification of righteousness with either the traditional *diké* of the city state or the *areté* of the aristocracy. It rejects also the relativism and scepticism of the sophists. It admits that the principle of righteousness is hard to find but insists that the wise and trained intelligence can find it. It consists in the rule of reason over the appetites and passions, and the true form of this rule is the basic form of the soul's life, making itself dimly felt in every man's felt need of inner integrity, but disclosing its clear outline only to trained minds who seek it earnestly.

There is much in these answers that leaves us dissatisfied, but

they contain some things that seem to be profoundly true. To be righteous a man must do, not what the desires of his heart demand, nor what tradition tells him to do, but what appeals to his own intelligence as right. He must follow his own enlightened conscience. But the human conscience needs enlightening, and enlightment comes only by thinking and thinking hard. Yet by hard thinking enlightment does come. And a man must be true to his enlightened conscience or he loses the integrity and strength of his own soul.

In all this, however, there are two things that we miss. (1) The assurance that inner integrity and strength of the soul is always worth what it may cost in physical suffering and economic loss. (2) Some guideposts in our thinking to discover what is right. Aristotle takes up these questions and answers the first by admitting that righteousness alone cannot assure well-being. A healthy soul needs a healthy body and political and economic security as well. But neither can these alone secure well-being without righteousness; and the reason for this is presented in his answer to the second question. It takes the form of an analysis of the conditions of the natural perfection of the volitional life which is Apollonian, through and through.

Aristotle's approach to these conditions is that of the ethics of self-realization. He asks in what does human well-being consist, and quickly decides that it must consist in the wholesome functioning of a man's whole life, the fulfillment of his potentialities. That part of his life with which ethics is concerned, however, is that which is distinctive of man and constitutes his highest fulfillment, his ultimate perfection. It is his power of reason. In the completest

possible development of rational capacity, therefore, Aristotle finds man's true *areté,* excellence, or virtue. The intellectual life, however, is not lived separately from the life of impulse, for impulse participates in reason by being subject to its guidance and control. The perfection of the life of impulse therefore consists in its rationally controlled fulfillment. This is moral virtue or excellence (*areté*), as distinct from the still higher intellectual virtue, or excellence, which consists in the pure and undisturbed exercise of the intelligence at its best.

Moral virtue consists, therefore, in the exercise of such control of the volitional life by reason that reason may be freed and supported for its highest flights. Such control does not consist in a slavish following of traditional rules or subservience to ideals of the past. It requires, rather, that everyone shall find for himself, regarding every phase of the life of impulse, where the balance lies between a deficiency of vigor and an excess which would disturb his inner harmony and stultify the development of that highest potentiality of his being, the life of reason. The ideal state of the soul is therefore a personality that is neither cowardly nor rash, neither vain nor humble, neither niggardly nor overgenerous, neither intemperate nor unduly abstemious. It neither commits injustice nor suffers it without protest, neither shirks the burdens of life nor makes unnecessary sacrifices, neither seeks more than its share of rewards nor is content with less. It is a personality that exercises wisdom in all things and cherishes above all the opportunity to cultivate the life of the intellect.

The ideal of personality, of the man of true *areté,* of virtue most to be admired, which Aristotle arrives at by this approach, is

presented in his picture of the high-minded or great-souled man, the man who *is* most worthy and is exactly conscious of his worth. For to be greatly worthy and not to know it is undue humility. But if one has great merit then to be justly conscious of it is the crown of the virtues. This highest of virtues is only possible to one whom fortune has favored with the physical conditions of well-being. He must be a man of property, well born, strong, handsome and intelligent. To these gifts he must himself, in his disciplined behavior, have added all the virtues. Then, in consciousness of his superior worth, he will conduct himself with dignity and moderation. He will be moderately pleased with great honors conferred upon him by good men, but not flattered by small ones. He will not rush into danger but will face it bravely if need be, ready to sacrifice his life rather than his honor. He does not seek benefits from others, but repays them generously, that others may be in debt to him rather than he to them. He is open in his hate and in his love. He speaks freely and frankly, scorning to hide his opinions. He is not vengeful, for he does not like to dwell on the thought of an injury, nor does he like to be reminded of benefits he has received from others.

This is the picture of what a highly civilized Greek gentleman thought a gentleman ought to be. It is an idealized picture of the aristocratic type in every highly developed civilization. We see in it all the three characteristics of the ideal of natural perfection. It envisions fulfillment of potentialities in its insistence on the necessity of possession of the physical means to self-expression and power. It recognizes the need of social integration in its insistence on the common virtues and an orderly society supporting its fine

gentlemen at the top. But above all it insists on rational control of the life of impulse to free the mind for full development of its highest capacities. This is what we mean by its distinctly Apollonian character.

After Aristotle both the Stoic and the Epicurean philosophies, which shared the field between them in later Greek and Roman times, continued the Aristotelian emphasis on rational self-control, but they were chiefly concerned with the problem of how to maintain the inward calm of the spirit and the fulfillment of higher potentialities in the face of adversity. The Stoics, in particular, labored to show that these attainments of the spiritual life are independent of the conditions of physical prosperity which Aristotle thought essential. Here again we see how the ideal changes in detail with changing conditions. In every case the thinker is analyzing his own experience of the constraints imposed by the conditions of attainment of natural perfection of the volitional life. In the misfortunes that fell upon Greek civilization in the fall of its free cities to great empires those who strove still to realize that perfection found ways to adjust themselves to misfortune and still maintain their spiritual growth and inner harmony and strength. The insights revealed truths about the spiritual life to which earlier thinkers had been blind.

In adjusting their ideal and its norms to the adverse conditions of their times mistakes also were made. The Epicureans made the mistake of narrowing the requirement of social integration. Despairing of a satisfactory order in the wider life of the community they adopted an escapist policy, advising withdrawal from the larger society to seek peace and harmony in a small circle of friends—a

policy which, if widely followed by the wisest and most virtuous members of a community would prove socially disastrous. The Stoics made a different mistake. They recognized social responsibility but tried to build defenses against personal adversity by cultivating an attitude of indifference to hardship and an exaggerated repression of the emotional life.

The Sources of Unity and Difference

The ethical theory of the Epicureans is not self-realizationist. They do not find the ground of moral norms in the requirements for realization of the potentialities of the self. They assume that pleasure is the only good and that everyone seeks pleasure and the avoidance of pain, and their ethics is simply a theory as to how best to obtain that end. Nevertheless it is clear from the writings of Epicurus that he felt morally justified in his position. He did not feel himself to be merely escaping responsibility, but rather thought of himself as having found the wisest way to pursue happiness and took satisfaction in showing the way to others. He taught his way of life with a good conscience, and in practice it differed little from that of those much more earnest moralists, the Stoics. There can be no doubt that he felt his way of life promised best to achieve what we have distinguished as the primary and basic element in the ideal of natural perfection, i.e., the fulfillment, so far as circumstances allowed, of the potentialities of the volitional life. He clearly saw the development of rational control as an essential condition of that goal, if not part of the goal itself, and he also saw the need of a certain limited type of social integration, in the cultivation of a circle of friends as an essential means to the end.

It may therefore be claimed that, though the ethics of Epicurus (and hedonism generally) differs in theoretical presentation from self-realizationism, it nevertheless satisfies the moral consciousness of those who accept it because it seems to them to propound the only true way to that fulfillment of the potentialities of the volitional life which they are accustomed to recognize and to name by the feeling tone that tends to accompany it—pleasure, or happiness. The great majority of hedonists have been psychological hedonists. They have believed that the sole goal of conscious volitional activity is the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. Their ethical theory, therefore, simply points the way to such fulfillment. Their difference from the self-realizationists is not as to the basic form of the ideal life. That, for both schools, consists in the completest possible fulfillment. The difference lies in the psychological theory of volition.

Platonist, Aristotelian, Stoic, Epicurean, as well as the earlier Greek moralists, can therefore be seen to have at the basis of their moral consciousness a certain ideal of what a man can be and ought to be; and the norms they propound are the principles they see involved as general or common conditions for the realization of that ideal. The norms differ, in part because of different views as to the best means, and in part because the ideals differ. And these differences, in the case of both ideals and the means to them, are due to differences in the circumstances of life and the depth of insight of those who propound them. Yet in its most basic feature the ideal is always the same. It is the *full* realization of the potentialities of the volitional life, the *completeness* of manhood or womanhood. It is the ideal of natural perfection. And this ideal

always carries with it two distinctive conditions which are, indeed, discovered to be not merely conditions but the higher part of the realization of the basic ideal. These are the development and exercise of rational self-control, and the process of social integration in which the social element of the volitional life finds fulfillment.

In every instance the ethical theorist, in propounding his ethical theory, is giving expression to the ideal which appeals to his own reflective and analytic moral consciousness—his *critical* conscience. He is not merely propounding what he wants, but what certain constraints within him demand of him, so that he can be morally satisfied with no other. Yet these constraints to which he is responding are not merely those of the moral tradition, which he feels as a result of the social conditioning to which he has been subjected from infancy. These philosophers have, more or less completely, rejected and overthrown tradition. The constraints to which they are responding are those which come from a deeper level within themselves, a level which they can feel as justifying the critical rejection of tradition. That level of constraint is that of their own inner need to maintain the integrity, the unity or wholeness, of their volitional life, and at the same time to free it for the fullest possible expression and further growth. This is the requirement to reach out toward attainment of natural perfection.

Responding to this requirement, to the constraints it places upon him and to the surge of vitality involved in it, the thinker formulates his view of what its attainment would mean. This becomes his ideal of what his own personality can be and ought to be. It is also the ideal of what every personality in the same cir-

cumstances can be and ought to be. From what he sees of the conditions of attaining it—the general or universal conditions as he believes them, generated by the nature of man and the circumstances of life—he frames his concepts of ethical norms. It is not surprising that thinkers come forward with different concepts of these norms. Nor is it surprising that at different stages of social evolution, and from differences in individual experience, they each frame their concepts of the ideal somewhat differently. There is, however, sufficient unity in those concepts, and, sufficient relevance to the conditions under which they were framed, for us to see that each of them is a portrayal, more or less accurate, of the ideal of natural perfection, and that the critical conscience which has generated them is an experience of the dynamic and the constraints of the volitional life as it presses toward the realization of its natural perfection.

The Christian Impact on The Apollonian Ideal

Christianity came into the Graeco-Roman world with a moral ideal that did not fit the nicely balanced rational harmony of the predominant Apollonian ethical theories. It did not, however, come with an ethical theory to support its ideal, but with a religious faith to preach it. It saw the moral law as grounded in the will of God and "written in the heart" of man, his conscience bearing witness to it if only he sincerely sought to know it. It found its dynamic in the conviction that the whole of the moral law has its ground and justification in a single principle which broke violently with the Apollonian emphasis on prudence and moderation, a principle which, though declared to be reasonable, could not be stated in

terms of reason, but which had to be stated instead in terms of love: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart . . . and thy neighbor as thyself."

The Christian criticism of the ethics of the philosophers thus proved more sweeping than any of their criticisms of each other. It spoke for the repressed multitudes, enslaved and exploited in all ancient civilizations. It condemned the pride of the Aristotelian ideal and the egoism of the Epicurean. It endorsed the ideal of rational self-control of both Aristotelian and Stoic. But at one point in particular it broke with the Stoic interpretation. It saw value in the emotional life so far as it is concerned with social values. At the heart of its ideal of personality was the exaltation of a great passion which it had seen in its founder, the passion for human welfare, broad, sweeping and impartial, breaking all barriers of economic, political and social status, of race and sex. Its ideal man loved his fellows so that he was willing to die in ignominy and pain rather than betray them to what he saw as religious bondage, ignorance and falsehood. Here was something that went far beyond the high Apollonian preference of death to dishonor. Here was no mere concern for measure, balance proportion, but a whole-souled passion. Here, too, was something new in the integration of the individual with his society. It was not merely an observance of the rules of social order, nor merely a loyalty of the individual to his own people, or his own city or state. It was an identification of the individual self with the interests, the true welfare, of humanity. It was something so radically different from the critical moral philosophies hitherto developed that it was many centuries before philosophers began to understand it.

To those who thought about it in the light of the philosophy and psychology of the Greeks the Christian ideal appeared irrational, and that any one should ever deliberately act in accord with it appeared miraculous. If righteousness is the health of the soul then how could it require of a god that he should die on the cross? A man or a god might well rationally prefer death to dishonor. A mortal might rationally choose an early and painful death to attain immortality. But that a god, already assured of immortality, should choose the shame and pain of crucifixion for love of mortal men was foolishness. It was foolishness because it allowed the impulsion of love to overwhelm the balance of the volitional life, and because a rational regard for harmonious fulfillment of one's own volitional life could not lead to such self-sacrifice.

The Christian, however, believed, not only that the Son of God had done this, but that it was the will of God that all men should exercise such a love. And, marvellously, those dynamic leaders among them who interpreted their faith actually felt themselves moved by it. This experience they attributed directly to the grace of God. They call it *agapé*—rational and impartial good will—but its uniqueness lay not so much in its aim as in its power. Because it was a new experience which had arisen in them with the new surge of their religious faith they believed it was the special gift of God to all who had faith in Christ, and available only through this faith.

As Christian theologians of the generations that followed sought to interpret and justify their faith in the light of Greek philosophy they were confirmed in their conviction that there was something miraculous in the *agapé* (love or good will) experienced

by the Christian community. For Greek psychology made such a virtue appear impossible. It recognized two sources of human action, impulse and reason; and moral virtue consisted in the control of impulse by reason. The *agapé* of the Christian, (universal and impartial good will) however was not recognized by them as part of the life of impulse. Neither could it be attributed to reason, for the control exercised by reason, in the view of all the philosophers, was a rational self-regard. It moderated the expression of impulse in the interests of internal harmony and the realization of the full capacities of the self. The virtues could all be summarized under the heads of wisdom, justice, courage and temperance. They were all prudential, and benevolence found no place except as an outcome of prudence and justice. In such a scheme of thought the *agapé* of the Christian was an irrational passion. As a rational, self-controlled virtue it was a psychological impossibility. The Christian theologian accepted this pagan psychology and reverently thanked God for the miracle of Christian love.

If we examine the Christian ideal from the standpoint of the Dionysian-Apollonian dichotomy we see that it is not Apollonian. It demands the exercise of reason, but it leaves the control of unruly impulses to the overruling passion of love rather than to a rational regard for harmonious and complete self-fulfillment. It requires social integration but entrusts it to impartial and intelligent good will rather than a rational respect for the requirements of the existing social order. Giving this supremacy to love it may become a disturbing force in the existing social order and may find its fulfillment in what to the Apollonian would appear as irrational self-sacrifice. In these respects it is Dionysian rather than Apollonian.

But it is Dionysian with a difference. For it does not teach a man to take a basically impartial view of all the drives of his volitional life. Those that tend most to be self-regarding or careless of human welfare it subordinates to the outreaching drive of *agapé,* love, and in its demand for control of these egoistic and socially destructive tendencies it outdoes the Apollonian. Thus, to the true Dionysian and to the true Apollonian—to both alike—the Christian ideal is foolishness.

Philosophical defenders of the Christian ideal have agreed with Plato that righteousness is the health of the soul, but they have usually rejected the identification of their ideal with what has been here called the ideal of natural perfection. The doctrine of *agapé* seems to go beyond anything that could be required by the naturalistic ideal, in either its Apollonian or Dionysian form, or by the most perfect balancing of them. Its lofty demands therefore seem to point to a deficiency in the ethic of self-realization.

THE DIONYSIAN IDEAL

THE APOLLONIAN emphasis on self-control and respect for the existing social order, and the Christian requirement of service, if necessary to the point of self-sacrifice, have been the predominant elements in ethical thought throughout the Christian era. On the whole, however, the emphasis has been on the Apollonian ideal of a stable society, ordered to meet the essential needs of the whole community and to suit the rational interests of its ablest leadership. The same is true of the ethics of the non-Christian civilizations. Hedonism has had many advocates, but they have worked toward Appollonian conclusions from a Dionysian starting point. For hedonism the starting point is Dionysian because it is maintained that pleasure is the only object of desire and the ideal is the maximization of pleasure. This is Dionysian in its definition of the goal as fulfillment of the life of impulse. But the great hedonists, from Epicurus to Sidgwick, have argued that the way to attain such fulfillment is through rational control of impulse and social integration. They have looked to education and legislation to canalize the individual's seeking of pleasure into socially useful, or at least innocuous, activities.

In the last century, however, two movements have come upon the stage of history, to challenge the rather smug Apollonian, or Apollonian-Christian, ideals of our civilization. These are the Marx-

ian and Nietzschian ideals, both basically Dionysian, the one cast in molds determined by a materialistic reading of nature and history, the other attaining a purer Dionysian form with the aid of a voluntaristic idealism for its philosophical background.

The Dionysian Ideal and Revolt of the Masses

For the Marxians human life is a part of a material world order which functions, not mechanically, but dialectically, i.e., through the clash of opposing movements which repeat a certain rhythm; the opposing forces attain an equilibrium which generates new oppositions within itself and these in turn are fused in a new equilibrium which repeats the process on a new level. The inevitable result is a forward movement in which new forces constantly find expression. The consciousness of man is a product of this material process which reflects and predicts, with more or less clarity and accuracy, the movement around it. Human impulses and volition are drives, generated in this material and conscious activity, which require certain material conditions in the environment for their fulfillment. Human welfare consists in such control of the material conditions that the drives of impulse are able to attain the completest possible fulfillment.

The ideal is thus emphatically Dionysian. There is no idealization of rational self-control, of balance, moderation, or of integration with the established social order. Life is seen rather as a conflict in which the existing social order is in a state of imminent collapse and its present concepts of justice are barriers to a better order. The ideal is a new freedom of the individual which is to be expressed in the present society by organized attack on the existing social order and which is to culminate in a new social order in

which the life of impulse in the individul will take a new form and can be freed from most of the restrictions by which it is now bound.

The key to this whole conception is in the theory of the manner in which the direction of impulse is determined. Because every impulse or desire requires material means for its accomplishment, it is argued, the whole character of the social system and the individuals in it must be shaped by its method of securing these material instruments, i.e., by its economic arrangements. The struggle to control these has produced the class organization of society, of which capitalism is the present phase. Under capitalism the profit motive is cultivated and developed into the dominant impulse of the dominant social class. The whole social order is organized to give it stimulus, freedom and protection. Self-realization in such a society means essentially the accumulation of financial power. The result is the gratification of the few and the stultification of the many until society is ripe for revolution. Those who see this situation developing are then moved to join in the overthrow of the existing economic order and to substitute for it a system of collective ownership of the means of production. Under this system, it is claimed, the individual will find he no longer needs to be concerned about obtaining possession of the material means of expressing the life of impulse. All he really needs for that purpose will be amply supplied by participation in the common task of production and there will be no premium of pride or power in private economic accumulation.

Generations growing up under the influence of this new economic order, it is argued, will eventually become practically devoid of the profit motive. The acquisitive impulse will shrink

into insignificance. The predominant interest will be in the cooperative processes whereby the community works collectively to secure the means of satisfying its needs and expressing its impulses. The vices of capitalist society—theft, corruption, prostitution, oppression, servility, war—will disappear. With a common respect for the common means of economic welfare the life of impulse can then be given free play in the self-expression of the individual, with little temptation for anyone to interfere with the self-expression of another. Social controls will be reduced to a minimum. The state, as we know it, will wither away. Thus, as Lenin predicted in a famous address on *The State and Revolution* in 1917, "freed from capitalistic slavery, from the untold horrors, savagery and infamies of capitalistic exploitation, people gradually will become accustomed to the observance of the elementary rules of social life that have been known for centuries and repeated for thousands of years in all school books; they will become accustomed to observing them without force, without compulsion, without subordination, without the special apparatus for compulsion which is called the state."

This idyllic picture of a Dionysian paradise is, however, only a promise for the future. During the revolutionary struggle and the period of dictatorship to follow it the dialectical materialist reading of the Dionysian ideal points to a different line of conduct. This period is one of war—of inevitable class war—in which force is the only means to victory and ruthless expediency the only guiding principle. Failure to use the most efficient means for overthrowing the present order of society, however contrary to ordinary moral concepts and humane scruples, can only prolong

and increase the agony. The outcome is eventually inevitable. Everywhere the revolution must come. The only question is how quickly the opposition can be liquidated. At this stage, therefore, the ideal of personality is the man who most intelligently sees how his own activity can further the revolution and flings himself into that activity with the utmost vigor of which he is capable, unhampered by any concern for those moral rules developed to bolster the present decaying social order, or even for those more "elementary rules of social life" which human beings will observe without effort at self-restraint in the happy days of the Marxian-Dionysian paradise that is yet to be.

This thesis can be attacked at many points. Its basic materialism has no philosophic justification. Its application of dialectical concepts to matter is unscientific. Its insistence on the overwhelming importance of economic conditions in human motivation is greatly exaggerated. Its assumption that the private profit motive can be removed without injury to the economy is naively optimistic, as is the hope that its removal would mean an end to most of the vices of our present society. Its denial of the possibility of gradually raising the economic level of the proletariat and diminishing the gap of class distinction is being falsified by the course of history. Its justification of ruthless and amoral methods in class warfare has demonstrated intolerably bad consequences. The whole philosophy is an elaborate and precariously balanced structure designed to justify the use of violent and amoral methods in promoting social revolution.

Whence then the attractiveness of this ideal and the program it is made to endorse? For it cannot be denied that it has won

enthusiastic and devoted adherents. The answer seems to be that its Dionysian promise of free and full self-realization, its call to whole-souled effort in a great, dynamic program, and its removal of all moral restraints that might hamper the fight to overthrow what is considered to be an oppressive and galling system of class supremacy, appeal to minds that are restless and either resentful of the inferiority of their own position or of the difficulties placed in the way of others. Our Apollonian culture seems to them to restrict too greatly the freedom and opportunity for self-realization of the many, and for that reason it must be overthrown.

The Dionysian Ideal and Counter-Revolution

Out of another philosophy, that of voluntaristic idealism, and in counter-revolution to the revolt of the masses, has come an opposing cult, consciously and clearly Dionysian, in the teaching of Nietzsche. For Nietzsche the health of the soul lies only in the full freedom of vigorous self-expression. He is in violent revolt against every restriction from without, and especially against the Christian concern for the protection of the weak and the democratic concern for limiting the power of the strong. In Christian and democratic morality he sees a terrible danger of man himself deteriorating, of "the *universal degeneracy of mankind* to the level of the absolutely gregarious animal, the brutalizing of man into a pygmy with equal rights and claims." It is an "anguish," he says, to see this and to see also "all that could still *be made out of man* through a favorable accumulation and augmentation of human powers."[1]

For Nietzsche the meaning of life is to be found, not in a

1. **Beyond Good and Evil.**

mere struggle for existence, nor in the pursuit of happiness, but in its sheer expansive movement from minimal expressions to the more abundant life of ever greater vigor and variety. This he calls "the will to power." This insight came to him as an inspiration when on one occasion in the Franco-Prussian war he saw the Prussian cavalry charging past him into battle. He saw life in that moment as essentially aggressive, its stronger forms triumphing over and exploiting the weaker, but he saw this aggressiveness and exploitation not as the end, but as the means to the expansion and development of yet more vigorous, competent, refined and varied forms of life. He saw life, too, as concerned less with its own preservation, contentment, peace, happiness, than with its expansive movement, growth, increase of power and capacity for new adventure. Where life is really alive, not stagnant or declining, it is ready to risk itself for the increase of its power. "Many things are more highly valued by the living than life itself; yet out of this very valuing speaks—the will to power!"[2]

The power which Nietzsche thus exalts is not, however, mere physical strength, nor is it mere political authority such as a Nero may wield. These are merely useful adjuncts to that power the growth of which is the end of life. What is essential to this true power is first: vitality, vigor and strength of purpose; second: mental capacity and activity of the intellect in all its possible phases. This true development of inner power does not necessarily require the external powers. "I have found power where people do not look for it, in simple, gentle and obliging men without the least inclination to domineer—and conversely the inclination to domineer

2. From **Thus Spake Zarathustra.**

has often appeared to me the sign of weakness: they fear their slavish soul and cast a king's mantle about it.[3] Nevertheless, the man of inward power (true will to power) is not content to be deprived of outward power. "Wherever the superior is *not* the more powerful *there is something missing in the superior himself*: he is only a fragment and shadow at most."[4] External power thus appears not as the end but as a means to the full realization of inward power, and the will to power will not hesitate to manifest ruthlessness and aggression if required to grasp the means for its own true development.

As a part of the development of inner power Nietzsche has a place for the Apollonian virtues, though it is carefully guarded against mere conformity and mediocrity. His picture of "nobility" strongly echoes Aristotle's "great-souled" man. Proper pride scorns to seek advantage over others in ways that are petty or mean. True self-respect, or self-reverence, is not self-indulgent. Measure, proportion, moderation, is a virtue of the inwardly strong, to be distinguished from the moderateness of slackness and mediocrity. It contains the tension of the taut rein upon fiery steeds. Yet "self-control and training are only one *stage* of elevation: higher stands the 'golden nature'."[5]

The golden nature is an individual who stands above the crowd. He has "the pathos of distance" from the multitude. It is not in integration with the social organism that the true ideal of life is to be realized, but in the development of individuality. The

3. Quoted from the **Nachgelassene Werke** by G. A. Morgan, **What Nietzsche Means** (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941), p. 122.
4. From **The Will to Power.**
5. **Ibid.**

social order is but a means and a medium in which individuality can grow and differentiate itself. Yet this higher growth is only for the few. It is not easy and it is not attained without suffering. The individual must painfully differentiate and reshape himself from the common world in which society has cast him. He must endure a certain solitude and much misunderstanding. He must be true to himself, shaping his own standards of good and evil.

This individual morality, however, Nietzsche recognizes, is only for the few. It is the loyalty of the strong and vigorous mind to the expression of its own genius. Below it are moralities on other levels. There is the "herding animal" morality of the society which has not yet advanced so far as to produce an aristocratic class. Here the standard is that of a common loyalty to the traditions of the tribe. Above it is the "master morality" of an aristocratic class. It sets the higher value on those traits and practices by which an aristocratic class or ruling race attains and maintains power—energy, pride, class or race loyalty, courage, self-discipline as a means to power in self-expression, refinement, chivalry, ruthlessness where needed to retain power. Opposed to "master morality" is the "slave morality," which expresses the desires of the repressed class. It exalts kindness, gentleness, mercy, love, humility, as graces. It preaches service and strives to level all down to the status of "pygmies with equal rights."[6] Nietzsche sees these ideals as expressing the longings of the downtrodden multitudes for relief from their burdens and as gradually imposing themselves on the aristocratic class by the subtle influence of mass psychology. In this he believes he sees a danger to be resisted—the danger of a

6. From **Beyond Good and Evil.**

levelling down of the superior group to that of the masses and a crushing of the spirit of individuality. The social distinctions of aristocracy, he urges, must be restored and preserved. The slave morality of Christianity must be left to the mere function of consolation of the servile class. Democracy must be destroyed. And aristocratic morality must learn to make room for the rise and expression of the distinctive individual to a degree that it has never done before.

Nietzsche's philosophy may be criticized as a reaction to barbarism. It may be explained as the expression of a warped personality in which genius, crushed by the rigidities of an Apollonian-Christian social order, finds expression in revolt and exultantly proclaims the values realized in such rebellious expression of a vivid individuality. It is exaggerated and one-sided. Nevertheless, it has a significance which must not be neglected. It expresses more clearly and strongly than any other the ultimate ideal of the ethics of self-realization—that the supreme value is only to be realized in the freedom of the volitional life to attain the fullest expression that is compatible with its own inner integrity and the conditions of the environment. The Apollonian and Christian emphasis upon the social order, as imposing restrictions upon the free and full expansion of individuality, is felt as an intolerable defect in the ideal, a limitation upon the human spirit in its outreach toward the perfecting of its being, the true fulfillment of its potentialities.

This Dionysian challenge to Apollonian principles of order indicates the extreme difficulty of depicting the ideal in terms of a balance between the requirements of social order and the drive

of the individual to freedom of self-expression. Such an attempt singles out general principles of orderly and wholesome relations among ordinary human beings in everyday life and incorporates these norms in the description of the ideal. It thus makes them rigid and absolute. Departures from them then appear as defects. Yet the exceptional individual must sometimes depart from these principles in order to realize an exceptional opportunity, and even the ordinary individual must occasionally depart from such norms in order to prevent an exceptional disaster. Genius, in particular, calls for this larger freedom. Thus the incorporation of Apollonian rules into the ideal itself cannot but chafe and gall the most vigorous and adventurous personalities and lead to the demand for recognition of a morality that frees the individual to pursue the goals in which he can find the fullest realization of his own volitional life untrammelled by rigid rules derived from general requirements of the social order.

The Dionysian Ideal and Democracy

In all its forms the Dionysian ideal expresses a passion for freedom as the *sine qua non* of complete self-realization. In Marx it turns in the direction of a revolutionary movement to free the masses. In Nietzsche it expresses the demand of the exceptional individual for exceptional freedom and opportunity, and it is ready to keep the masses in chains in order to open the way for exceptional self-fulfillments. In John Dewey, the great American apostle of freedom, the ideal of complete self-realization is set up as the ideal for all, both high and humble, and an ideal that can be attained, it is claimed, without any radical change in the social structure of our democracy.

In framing his concept of self-realization as the ethical criterion, however, Dewey is careful to distinguish it from certain forms of the theory which he (rightly, in our view) regards as misleading. Those moralists, he says, are mistaken, who would make self-realization the "end-in-view" at which we should consciously aim in moral conduct. "To make self-realization a conscious aim might and probably would prevent full attention to those very relationships which bring about the wider development of self."[7] Nevertheless, he says, self-realization may be the end of moral conduct in another sense. It is "the outcome and limit of right action." The *kind of* self which is formed through action which is faithful to relations with others will be a fuller and broader self; . . . the kind of self which results from generous breadth of interest may be said alone to constitute a development and fulfillment of self."[8]

Dewey, then, is not the sort of self-realizationist who believes that we should consciously aim at self-realization. But he is a self-realizationist in the sense that he believes that true self-realization, or "development and fulfillment of self" is the psychological consequence of ethical conduct at its best and so sets the standard for moral judgment. It is the self-in-action, he insists, that is judged to be moral or immoral, not the self or act in isolation from each other; and "a moral judgment upon an act is also a judgment upon the character of selfhood of the one doing the act."[9] Further, the *moral virtue* of the act lies in its being a contribution to the growth of the self.

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7. Dewey and Tufts, **Ethics** (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1932), p. 335.
8. **Ibid., p. 335.**
9. **Ibid.,** p. 318.

> Except as the outcome of arrested development there is no such thing as a fixed, ready-made, finished self. All voluntary action is a remaking of self. . . . In the strictest sense it is impossible for the self to stand still, it is becoming, and becoming for the better or the worse. It is in the *quality* of becoming that virtue resides.[10] We set up this and that end to be reached, but *the* end is growth itself. To make an end a final goal is to arrest growth. . . . At each point there is a distinction between an old, an accomplished self, and a new and moving self, between the static and the dynamic self. The former aspect is constituted by habits already formed. . . . Hence the old, the habitual self, is likely to be treated as if it were *the* self. . . . We tend to favor the old self. . . . In this way . . . we contract and harden the self. . . . The growing, enlarging, liberated self, on the other hand, goes forth to meet new demands and occasions, and readapts and remakes itself in the process. . . . The necessity for choice between the interests of the old and of the forming, moving, self is recurrent, . . . everywhere there is an opportunity to go beyond what one has been. . . . Indeed, we may say that the good person is precisely the one who is most conscious of the alternative, and is the most concerned to find openings for the newly forming or growing self; since no matter how 'good' he has become, he becomes 'bad' (even though acting upon a relatively high plane of attainment) as soon as he fails to respond to the demand for growth. Any other basis for judging the moral status of the self is conventional. In reality, direction of movement, not the plane of attainment and rest, determines moral quality."[11]

This is a very clear statement of the ideal of the natural

10. This and the next two sentences indicate the sense in which, for Dewey, self-realization constitutes the ethical end or standard.

11. **Ibid.**, pp. 340-42, **passim.**

perfection of personality as the ground of moral judgment, and the ideal is stated in its Dionysian rather than its Apollonian form. Yet Dewey believes that, by reason of the conditions of human life the ideal yields guiding principles, not as prescribing specific courses of action, but as intellectual tools for analyzing the situation, suggesting the important considerations for which one should be on the lookout. These principles are such as chastity, justice and the Golden Rule.[12] Thus, for Dewey, the ideal, though stated with the Dionysian rather than the Apollonian emphasis, yet yields what we have described as norms, not as moral absolutes, but as principles of secondary generality. And these norms follow from the ideal by reason of the order of nature, including both the nature of man and of his environment.

> The facts of desiring, purpose, social demand and law, sympathetic approval and hostile disapproval are constant. We cannot imagine them disappearing as long as human nature remains human nature, and lives in association with others. The fundamental conceptions of morals are, therefore, neither arbitrary nor artificial. They are not imposed upon human nature from without but develop out of its own operations and needs. Particular aspects of morals are transient; they are often, in their actual manifestation, defective and perverted. But the framework of moral conceptions is as permanent as human life itself.[13]

The above is the concluding paragraph of Part II of Dewey and Tuft's *Ethics,* in which Dewey discusses problems of ethical theory. The chapter which ends thus opens with a summary of the conclusions arrived at in the earlier part of the discussion,

12. **Ibid.,** p. 309.
13. **Ibid.,** p. 344.

stating what have there been found to be the chief characteristics of a self which can be called "good." These may be regarded as presenting Dewey's analysis of those "fundamental conceptions of morals" which develop out of the "operations and needs" of "human nature," as he has indicated in the paragraph above. It will be well to have Dewey's own statement of these requirements.

> The self should be *wise* or prudent, looking to an inclusive satisfaction and hence subordinating the satisfaction of an immediately urgent single appetite; it should be *faithful* in acknowledgment of the claims involved in relations with others; it should be solicitous, *thoughtful,* in the award of praise and blame, use of approbation and disapprobation, and, finally, should be *conscientious* and have the active will to discover new values and to revise former notions.[14]

This description by Dewey of the ideal form of the self, as a living, active, growing entity, is, so far as it goes, an excellent statement of the ideal of natural perfection, and his four broad principles or norms (wisdom, faithfulness, thoughtfulness, conscientiousness) are such as have commended themselves to moral idealists throughout the centuries.

In passing from the description of the *facts* of the nature of the self, its operations and needs, to a statement of *norms* (the self *should* be wise, etc.) there is no illogical transition, because what is meant by "should," or "norm," here is that these modes of conduct are in fact required in order to maintain that continuity of growth which would constitute the fulfillment of the potentialities, the perfecting, of the self or personality. No criticism, therefore, can be levelled against Dewey charging him with an illegitimate

14. **Ibid.,** p. 315.

transition from "is" to "ought," from "fact" to 'value." The values he puts forward are statements of facts, his norms are requirements for life rooted in life's natural conditions.

At the same time the meaning of "should" or "ought" in this sense is quite different from the usage in what Kant called the "hypothetical imperative." It states what one must in fact do in order to attain or maintain the natural perfection of the self, not what one must in fact do in order to fulfill some particular desire, or to maintain happiness. The requirements or conditions of natural perfection are basically the same whatever may be the particular desires of any individual, and they remain the same if he does not care one iota about natural perfection. And there is no guarantee that these requirements are the same as those for attainment of the greatest amount of pleasure. The "should" or "ought" which is used to state a requirement of natural perfection or self-realization is therefore a distinctly *normative* term.[15] The only question that may legitimately be asked is whether the ideal and norms of natural perfection are the same as the moral ideal and norms.

It must be admitted, however, that Dewey has never succeeded in making crystal clear the way in which, in his thought, fact and potentiality are related to norm. He has often been criticized for making the transition illegitimately. Charles Stevenson, for example,[16] seizes on this point as his basic difference from

15. It asserts, as Kant would say, a "categorical" or unconditional imperative. Kant's categorical imperative is also a requirement of the natural perfection of the self. Its error lies in considering those requirements as fulfilled too simply by maintaining the rational consistency of the practical reason.

16. Charles Stevenson, **Ethics and Language** (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954) p. 254. See also Morton G. White, **Social Thought in America** (New York: Viking Press, Inc. 1949).

Dewey. Stevenson rightly insists that in the statement of a norm, in "ought," or "should," or "right," there is a *prescriptive* element that is certainly not present in every *predictive* statement. He knows that Dewey also recognizes this, i.e., that Dewey not only holds that all value judgments are predictions of consequences, but also holds that they are predictions of a special kind concerned with specially selected consequences. Stevenson, however, cannot see *how,* in Dewey's view, these consequences are selected. He, himself, concludes that they can only be selected by the preferences of the person making the value judgment. Thus, for Stevenson, the prescriptive element in a value judgment is an arbitrary demand of the person making the judgment that other people shall approve of the same things as he does. For Dewey, however, the prescriptive element is not arbitrary. It is fixed by the natural conditions of human life—the conditions that must be fulfilled in order that the further and fuller potentialities of the life concerned may go on being realized, moving in the direction of their utmost possible fulfillment. Stevenson's criticism of Dewey rests on a failure to connect those passages in *The Quest for Certainty* and *Theory of Valuation,* where he finds Dewey insisting that there *is* a distinction between the *desired* and the *desirable,* with those passages in the *Ethics* to which we have referred, where Dewey distinguishes the desires that are *really desirable* as those desires which in fact tend to realize the broader and fuller potentialities of the self as a living, growing and integrated whole.

The real difficulties in Dewey's thesis lie, not in his transition from fact to value, but in the inadequacy of his analysis of the facts, which leaves them insufficient to yield the values he deduces

from them. As we have seen he repudiates the suggestion that self-realization should be consciously aimed at as the end-in-*view*. He sees that to do so would tend to "prevent full attention to those very relationships which bring about the wider development of self." Yet the criterion by which we have to tell which desires are really desirable is that of their contribution to self-realization. It is difficult to see how we can do this without making self-realization *in some sense and to some degree* an end-in-view. His interpretation requires us to make self-realization the criterion by which we decide which ends to pursue without making the maintenance or realization of such a form of selfhood our end-in-view. This is, surely, something psychologically paradoxical, indeed self-contradictory. Yet Dewey is right about the psychological danger of consciously aiming at the perfection of the self. To do so would either cultivate spiritual pride or lead to a distressing sense of guilt and inferiority. If self-realization is to be made the ground or basis of moral norms then we must be able to show how those norms can be fulfilled without consciously aiming at self-realization. That is the subject of our next lecture.

Further criticism of Dewey's thesis must concern itself with the question whether the standard of self-realization as he defines it, and the concept of human nature (or human motivation) as he analyses it, can really yield the fundamental principles and framework of moral conceptions he derives from it. The first of his fundamental principles is that "the self should be *wise* or prudent, looking to an inclusive satisfaction and hence subordinating the satisfaction of an immediately urgent single appetite." This norm may be granted. In Dewey's analysis of human motivation, however,

it has to be made the basis of all the other norms, and this is a strain which it will not bear. From prudential considerations he has to derive his second norm, that the self "should be *faithful* in acknowledgment of the claims involved in relation with others;" and he has to show that this involves application of those other principles (e.g. chastity, justice and the Golden Rule) which experience has shown to be required by a free, stable and progressive society, and which Dewey himself endorses. All this has to be derived from the individual's prudential concern with fulfillment of his own desires.

In his analysis of motivation Dewey begins from the fact that life is essentially active. Human action is not merely a *re*action to stimuli; it is the expression of the creative impulsion of life. Inaction, to a healthy man, is boredom. But this drive to action, he points out, must serve the essential needs of the organism, and it tends to become canalized into habits. Habits, however, are formed under the influence of the social environment and are, for the most part, shaped to serve the needs of the group as well as the individual. When the individual finds his natural dynamic and habitual action stultified by external obstacles, or by conflicting impulses within himself, he stops to think. A satisfactory solution is found when the life impulse again finds a way for "unified orderly release in action."[17] This is the only criterion Dewey can recognize for the distinction between the good way of life and the bad. True good consists in finding ways that are continuously open. Wisdom, as we have seen, finds the way to more and more inclusive satisfactions.

17. **Human Nature and Conduct** (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1922) p. 210.

It is Dewey's belief that, because man's habits are socially framed, and because of the individual's great need of the cooperation and fellowship of the social group, really inclusive satisfactions for the individual will always have to harmonize with a considerate and fair regard for the claims of others, and will require loyal cooperation in the common interests. Experience seems to show that this is true in general and in the long run. But experience also seems to indicate that it is not true in every case, for every individual. Part of the trouble is that the individual cannot see the full range of consequences of his actions. The young man in our illustration,[18] for example, may well calculate the chances of the most inclusive range of satisfaction of his interests and conclude that he had better continue the sale of the useless patent medicine. No one could foresee all the subtle inner consequences upon himself of such a decision and weigh these adequately in the balance. Still more important is the fact that the habitual interests, likes and dislikes, favoritisms and prejudices, grow fixed in forms that have bad social consequences. The decisions of a person with interests thus fixed as to what would bring him the most inclusive range of satisfactions, or give to his impulses the most unified and orderly release in action, would therefore often be socially bad. Chief among these fixations of interest that would give unsocial bias to decisions made this way is the tendency to personal pride and the desire for power which so easily becomes a part of the character of able and successful people. It needs to be offset by ethical considerations of a kind that would not arise if all decisions were made in accord with Dewey's analysis of motivation.

18. Ch. I, p. 10.

THE CHRISTIAN IDEAL

THE THINKERS who first expounded Christian teaching to the pagan world did not feel the need of grounding its ethics in a rational theory of natural order, whether the self-realizationist theory or any other. They claimed that the truth concerning man's basic duties to his fellows could be seen by all men who honestly tried to see it, though in the hardness of their hearts they shut their eyes to it. It had been explicitly taught in the words of the prophets and of Jesus Christ, but was equally available to the moral insight of all men, apart from revelation. Even the Gentiles, says St. Paul, "show that what the law requires is written on their hearts, while their conscience also bears witness."[1] The moral law is thus seen as grounded in the will of God, and God's will is not arbitrary, but expressive of His nature. The nature of God is love—an impartial love toward all His children—and the law which expresses His will is that His children should love one another with a similar impartial love. This law of love, says Jesus, is the basis of all that more specific moral instruction found in "the law and the prophets."[2]

The Christian Ideal

Christian ethical theory therefore takes the form, not of self-realizationism, but of what contemporary moralists call "intuition-

1. **Rom. 2:15** (R.S.V.)
2. **Matt. 22:40.** (R.S.V.)

ism" and "ideal utilitarianism." It says that the moral law can be intuitively known and it states the moral end as the production of the maximum possible amount of genuine good for each and every person. The attention of the individual is thus turned by the moral law away from himself as end, except as he participates as one among many in equitably sharing the available good, or as he incidentally finds his own good in caring for that of others. Self-realization, in the sense of the natural perfection or fulfillment of his own personality, is definitely *not* the end at which the Christian is instructed to aim. He may aspire to grow in the direction of moral perfection, but to do so he is told that he must turn his attention away from the self as end and devote himself to the service of God and man. The way of salvation involves a paradox, "For whoever would save his life shall lose it, and whoever loses his life for my sake will find it."[3] In brief, in the Christian conception, the self is made perfect only in righteousness, and the way of righteousness is that of self-forgetting love. To seek self-fulfillment is self-stultifying; it is the way to lose one's life, not to find it. But man has no need to *seek* self-fulfillment. It will come to him unsought if he seeks first the kingdom of God. The true way of self-realization is, paradoxically, the way of self-forgetting service of one's fellowmen.

The *end*, therefore, at which the Christian is instructed to aim, is general human well-being. But when we ask for a reason why one ought to aim at this end, and not put first our own ultimate well being, we are led, in a somewhat roundabout way, to find that the *ground* of the moral law is self-realization. The ground of the

3. **Matt. 22:25** (R.S.V.)

law is not the end at which it tells us to aim, but the reason it gives for telling us to aim at the end to which it points. We ask, then, for this ground, or reason: "Why ought I to love my neighbor as myself?" The first step in the Christian answer is "Because it is the will of God." We then ask "Why ought I to obey God?" The answer is not "In order to avoid punishment," or "To obtain eternal happiness," but "Because it is right to obey God; and it is right because only in obedience to the will of God can man fulfill the destiny for which God made him; because only by bringing his own will into accord with the will of God can man's own nature find its fulfillment, its perfecting, its completeness; because to live in accord with the will of God is to be spiritually whole; it is the true health of the soul."

Thus, for the Christian, the *meaning* of "ought," or "right" or "duty," is the same as for the ethic of self-realization. It is that which is required for the health of the soul, the perfecting or completion or fulfillment of personality. And a moral norm is a requirement which, by reason of the essential nature of the volitional life of man, must be fulfilled in order for that volitional life to maintain its integrated wholeness and grow in continuous fulfillment.

The concept of the ground or reason for moral norms, in the Christian ethic, is therefore the same as in naturalistic theories of self-realization; and the ideal is conceived in its Dionysian form of complete and uninhibited self-realization, limited only by the inner conditions of its own integrated wholeness. It agrees, however, with the Apollonian stress on the need for self-control in order that this condition of integrity may be maintained. It differs from most

forms of self-realization theory (Dewey's being the notable exception with which it is in agreement) in that it insists that, although the conditions of self-realization determine the moral norms to which we must adhere, yet the ideal of self-realization must not be made the end-in-view at which moral action must aim. It insists, rather, that to do this is morally self-stultifying, issuing in the moral disaster of spiritual pride. It differs from Dewey's and from most naturalistic interpretations of the self in singling out as the one ultimate and basic objective condition of the perfecting of personality, and therefore the ultimate and basic objective norm, that all motivation should be subject to one broad and dominant motive—an impartial concern for human well being, the principle of agape, the norm of brotherly love.

Natural Perfection and the Principle of Agape

Christian ethical theory then may be said to hold, on intuitionist grounds, to an ideal utilitarian theory of the ethical end or norm and, at the same time, to adopt a self-realizationist view of the meaning of moral judgments. It maintains what Reinhold Niebuhr calls "the paradox of self-realization through self-giving," recognizing that "the kind of self-giving which has self-realization as its result must not have self-realization as its end."[4] It is not yet clear, however, whether the Christian ideal of the perfection of personality can be equated with the ideal of natural perfection derivable from empirical psychological considerations. Naturalistic ethical theories have not, in the past, so interpreted the process of self-realization; and Christian theologians have based their ethical

4. Reinhold Niebuhr, **Christian Realism and Political Problems** (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953) pp. 140-141.

teaching on intuitive insight and revelation, rather than try to deduce their norms from an empirical analysis of the natural conditions of the fulfillment of the potentialities of personality. It is therefore a question of considerable importance whether the Christian interpretation of the conditions of true self-realization—"Self-realization through self-giving"—can be sustained in the light of our modern understanding of the psychology of personality.

It must be admitted that most psychological theories of the past assume that intelligent voluntary behavior must always be self-regarding. To them, therefore, the attainment of self-realization through self-giving love is not merely paradoxical but impossible. The psychology of the Greek philosophers, as we have already seen, made the Christian doctrine of agape appear as foolishness. Christian theologians, accepting the Greek psychology, but recognizing the existence of the virtue of Christian love as a fact, contended that it was only made possible by aid of the miracle of divine grace.

The difficulty with this ancient and mediæval solution is that the virtue of self-forgetting benevolence is recognized and manifested by others besides Christians. With the beginning of the modern period naturalistic philosophers such as David Hume, and those of a liberal Protestant persuasion such as Butler and Hutcheson, pointed to this fact and claimed it as indicating a natural general tendency to benevolence in human nature which only needed encouragement to ripen into a genuinely benevolent personality. Reason, or intelligence, they argued, is not necessarily self-regarding. Indeed it is not a motive-power of any kind, but simply an instrument for finding means to fulfill our interests. If the interest is selfish, reason serves the selfish ends; if the interest

is benevolent, reason serves the ends of benevolence. The Christian virtue of agape, or rational benevolence, was thus shown to be no miracle, but a natural expression of the nature of man as an intelligent social creature.

Modern naturalism, therefore, found no difficulty in showing that man is capable of genuine rational benevolence. Hume vigorously rejects the "selfish theory" that all apparently benevolently-intentioned actions are really inspired by enlightened self-interest.[5] It is true that Bentham and the psychological hedonists and many of our contemporary social scientists still harbor this hoary fallacy, apparently oblivious of the devastating criticism to which it has been subjected in the past two hundred years, but space does not permit a repetition of that criticism here. Wiser naturalistic philosophers, such as Hume and Dewey, however, do not make this mistake. They recognize that benevolent impulses are as natural to man as those of self-display, and that society encourages them and develops them into strong habits. Naturalism, therefore, has no difficulty in recognizing the *existence* of rational benevolence.

To say that rational benevolence *exists,* however, is not the same as saying that it *ought* to exist, and it is still further from saying, as does Christianity, that it ought to be made supreme in human conduct. Hume saw clearly the logical fallacy involved in passing from a statement of what *is* to a statement of what *ought-to-be,* and he contented himself with showing that human beings *can* be rationally benevolent, that it is in general (though not always) in accord with one's own enlightened self-interest to be

5. David Hume, **An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals** (Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1930), p. 50.

benevolent, and that benevolence is most generally approved as the most admirable and important of virtues. This, however, as we have seen, is not enough for the statement of the principle of benevolence as a norm. That requires that we show that attitudes of benevolence are an essential part of that development of personality which we have called the attainment or maintenance of natural perfection. And to give naturalistic support to Christianity's claim that rational benevolence, or agape, is the one basic norm of the moral life we must be able to show that the ideal of natural perfection requires the supremacy of the motive of rational benevolence over all other interests in the structure of personality. This was not attempted by Hume. Nor has it been achieved, if attempted, by any naturalistic philosopher or psychologist prior to the twentieth century. I do not think that it has been very convincingly demonstrated even in the present century. But I wish to show that, with the evidence now available, this can be done.

The Fallacy of Egoism

From the standpoint of ethics the most significant discovery that has come out of modern studies of psycho-pathology is that of the pathogenic character of psychological introversion. By introversion I here mean the habitual tendency to make the states of the self the ultimate end-in-view. The healthy mind is habitually extroverted in the sense that its predominant habit is to give attention to objects external to the self and its predominant interests are in objects of the environment, both persons and things; its predominant ends-in-view are concerned with shaping and reshaping the environment, physical and personal; its satisfactions are

found in progressive achievement and final attainment of these goals; *feelings* of satisfaction are enjoyed as incidental to the activity, rather than pursued as its ends; and every attainment or failure is the starting point, sometimes the stimulus and sometimes a means, to the formation and pursuit of new objectives in the environmental situation; concern with the self (with feeling states, and with the condition and the functioning and the powers of the body and the mind) takes the form, not of concern with the ultimate end-in-view, but of concern with the effectiveness of the means, the physical and mental instruments, which he needs to fulfill his objective interests. If an extroverted boy breaks a leg his chief concern is how it is going to affect his capacity to kick a football, or do whatever else he is most interested in doing with his legs. If an introverted boy breaks a leg his chief concern is how much pain and discomfort it is going to cause him and how it is going to affect his physical appearance or social prestige.

Introversion, in the sense in which it is apt to have bad effects in the development of personality, should not be confused with introspection or reflective self-examination with a view to understanding one's own motivation and obtaining a true estimate of one's capacities. The term "introversion" is sometimes used broadly to include this taking of a *cognitive* interest in the self, but the sense in which the term refers to a potentially pathogenic tendency is narrower. It refers to the habit of attending to the states of the self, not merely with a view to understanding them as means, or factors to be dealt with, in achieving objective goals, but as making the creation of a certain state of the self the end-in-view, the goal in which satisfaction is found. This is done when the end aimed

at is the creation of a certain feeling state (of pleasure or comfort) or the building up of the idea of the self as a person of prestige or power.

To avoid confusion on this issue one should also be clear as to the nature of the fallacy in psychological hedonism, the theory that all deliberate human motivation is desire for pleasure or the avoidance of pain. To see the error in this view one should note first that pleasure is of two kinds, pleasant sensation and the pleasure of interested activity. Unpleasant experience is also of two kinds, painful or unpleasant sensation and the unpleasantness or sorrow found in frustration of interested activity or destruction of its objects. The interested activity in which pleasure is found is always goal-directed activity, and the goal is usually not the creation of pleasant sensation within the self, but the achieving of some objective external to the self. Without the interest in this objective as end-in-view there can be no pleasure in the activity in pursuit of it and no satisfaction in the reaching of the end. Pleasure is only felt as the *result* of the fact that the objective has stimulated interest and the interest is being fulfilled. Memory of the pleasure may produce a desire to repeat the activity for the sake of the pleasure and this is then an introvert end. But there can be no pleasure found in the repetition unless the objective can again arouse interest as an extrovert end—an interest in the attainment of the objective for its own sake.

In the repetition of interested activities that have been found pleasant in the past, and in the continuation of those found pleasant in the present, there thus tends to arise a duality of ends competing

for attention. There is, first, the primary objective which has aroused interest. Without a continued interest in this objective as end-in-view there can be no pleasure in the pursuit or the attainment. But there is, secondly, the feeling of pleasure that arises in successful pursuit of the goal and in the temporary gratified feeling of attainment when it is reached. These pleasant states of consciousness tend to attract attention as ends to be sought for their own sake. But in so far as this happens the effect tends to be self-frustrating. This is the significance of the "hedonistic paradox" discovered by the Greeks: "To get pleasure we must forget it." Attention to our own pleasant (or unpleasant) states of consciousness, in the course of interested activity, tends to lower interest in the primary objective so that the activity is not enjoyed as much; and it also interferes with successful performance. Choice of one's line of activity for its pleasantness in the past tends to repetition to the point of staleness, instead of discovery of fresh objects of interest. The pursuit of pleasure for its own sake is thus a frustrating and disappointing exercise. To get pleasure we must forget it. To find pleasure we must refrain from seeking it. We must find objectives that grip our interest to the exclusion of the thought of our own pleasure or comfort and pursue them. If we do so then pleasure will be an incidental by-product of our absorption in the pursuit of these other ends.

The feeling-states of pleasure and comfort are not the only introvert objective that the personality can develop. The idea of the self also tends strongly, and still more disastrously, to become an introvert end. The idea of the self grows gradually and in interaction with the idea of other selves. The idea

of *what* we are is largely a reflection of the judgments others pass on us. Naturally and inevitably we develop a positive and constructive interest in building up for ourselves a picture of ourselves which compares favorably with the picture we form of others. We want to be able to think well of ourselves and we want others to think well of us. To satisfy this constructive interest in the self we cultivate those characteristics we have learned to admire; we try to display those characteristics to others and to secure notice of them. This is the attitude called "pride." It is the root of most of our anxieties and of some intense satisfactions. It is the stimulus of much of our best activity and of most of our worst sins against other human beings. It is an impulsion with an insatiable appetite, never long content with one kind and degree of gratification but hungering and thirsting always for new and stronger means of satisfaction. Because the judgment of the self is always made by comparison with other selves pride is always an impulsion to competition and finds its most intense satisfactions in the defeat of other persons and the exercise of power over them. It is thus the source of most of our economic rivalry, imperialism and war; but it is also the impulse behind most of our really vigorous productive efforts. And because pride seeks its satisfaction in the plaudits of society most of the rivalry it stimulates issues in socially valuable activity.

Pride, therefore, is a motive that is not only an inevitable feature of human personality, it is also an essential feature of any strong and vigorous character and of a prosperous and progressive society. Yet the possession of pride does not make for happiness in the individual who possesses it. It is a whip driving

him to activity; it is the constant root of anxiety; and its satisfactions are very short-lived.

If pride is so strong as to become the predominant motive it becomes self-defeating. It may still drive the person to do things that are socially valuable, but the motive of pride is detected, despised and resented. The good work done earns fewer plaudits, and they become grudging and insincere; the reactions of the beneficiaries become ungrateful. Cooperation is lost. Effectiveness in leadership fails. If the pride becomes so strong as to develop a lust for power it becomes a positive evil, the principal source of injustice, meanness and cruelty. Pride, however, is not at its worst so long as it is confident of the powers and status of the self. When the strong concern for the status of the self (which is the essence of pride) is afflicted by doubt or wounded by a sense of inferiority then this humiliated pride becomes bitterly resentful of the success and happiness of others. It seeks the resuscitation of the comparative status of the self by lowering that of others, humiliating them, crushing and hurting them. It is this that is the chief source of all that type of conduct which takes positive delight in inflicting injury on others.

Humility, the virtue commonly conceived as the antithesis of pride, is best understood as consisting of an approximately accurate estimate of the capacities and achievements of the self in comparison with others, erring, if at all, in an overgenerous estimate of other selves. It is not incompatible with a moderate pride (understanding by "pride" a concern for the status of the self) so long as that concern is not the predominant motive of the personality. Pride need not become self-defeating or socially

injurious if its strength is outmatched on the crucial occasions by the strength of extrovert motives, and in particular by the strength of concern for human welfare in general.

The upshot of this discussion of the pleasure-motive and pride is that we may lay it down as a negative principle, or norm, of wholesome personal development that the egoistic or introvert motives must not be allowed to become the predominant motives in the structure of personality. There must always be some other motives powerful enough to hold them in check.

The Interest in Human Welfare

Our next step is to ask whether we can lay down any general principle as to which type of motive should be strongest. From the standpoint of society in general this question is easily answered. Society would be healthiest if the impartial interest in human welfare, as such, were the predominant interest of every individual. It is not, however, immediately obvious that the health (the natural perfection) of the individual personality requires the predominance of this same altruistic interest. There are two considerations, however, which, taken together with the fact of the self-defeating character of introvert motives, show that this is the case—i.e., that the natural perfection of the individual requires the predominance in his character of the motive of benevolence, agape, the impartial concern for human welfare.

The first of these considerations is the fact that, of all objects external to the self, the ones which ordinarily tend to be most interesting to human beings are other human beings. Man's life is so much wrapped up with that of his fellows that this

inevitably becomes the case. The introvert is more interested in himself than in other people. But of all the objects external to himself it is with other people that he is apt to be most concerned. And, of all the objects with which an extrovert is concerned, human beings almost inevitably assume the place of prime importance. A man may develop an intense interest in dogs or horses, in painting pictures, or in the study of astrophysics or infusoria, but these tend, normally, to be specializations of interest within the broader and deeper background of interest in human beings. He wishes to show his dogs or his pictures to others and to publish his scientific findings. No normal person would permanently surrender the society of human beings for the cultivation of any special interest. If an individual shows a tendency to withdraw from human society there is always a special reason for it. Frequently he is an introvert with a sense of inferiority that is constantly painfully aroused by social contacts. Sometimes he has a strong specialized interest that available company does not share, so that, finding himself rebuffed, distracted and unappreciated by the human society he has met he retires from it to a very considerable extent; yet if he had to choose between complete surrender of his special interest and complete surrender of human society he would unhesitatingly give up the former.

It is clear, then, that the extrovert interests of the normal human being are most strongly concerned with other human beings. Human beings are *intrinsically* interesting to other human beings. They grip our interest and stimulate us to active response more readily than any other type of object and they hold our in-

terest and move us more strongly. We can and do develop specialized interests in other types of objects which may be stronger than our interest in *ordinary* human affairs, and non-human phenomena of an extraordinary character may temporarily grip and move us more strongly than ordinary human phenomena, but human objects are capable of developing in us even greater specialized interests than non-human, and extraordinary human phenomena grip and move us more strongly than any other kind of phenomena. The general principle, therefore, is clear. Human beings inevitably tend to have their interest gripped and moved by other human beings more strongly than by any other objects.

The second consideration, bearing on the question as to what type of motive should be strongest in order to develop and maintain the natural perfection of personality, is the fact that an objective interest in any living thing tends normally, with certain special exceptions, to be constructive rather than destructive. The broader principle here operative is that the active response to an object that arouses interest follows the lines of the meaning of the object. Here the influences of the culture and of social conditioning are predominant. These influences present some creatures as things to be feared and either avoided or destroyed, others as things to be hunted and either captured or killed. Apart from these special instances, however, the normal meaning that any living thing has for us is that of a thing that grows and functions in ways that tend to fulfill the distinctive potentialities of its kind; and, in the absence of such specialized interests as those of hunting and fear, it is this meaning that determines the response to it when it arouses interest. Man's nor-

mal response, therefore, to any living thing, *once its meaning is grasped as a thing of such and such potentialities,* is to promote those potentialities. This is manifest in the interest of children and primitives in keeping pets and in the traditions found in every culture whereby animals and plants are cultivated with an interest in preserving them alive and producing perfect specimens, an interest that goes far beyond the economic, and even beyond the aesthetic, motive.

This tendency to take a constructive interest in objects is not confined to living things. Interest in inanimate objects also tends to be constructive unless turned into destructive channels by motives of fear, hunting, utility, or by introvert motives of prestige, power, pleasurable sensation or ease. Man is primarily a creator rather than a destroyer. This is shown, above all, by the way he uses his leisure, especially by the labor he devotes to the arts. Even his introvert motives are constructive. They go far beyond mere self-preservation and gratification to pursue goals of self-promotion, of achievement, power and display. It is these motives of constructive egoism that account for most of man's apparently wanton destructiveness toward things, animals and other human beings.

We arrive then at the conclusion that man's interest in other human beings tends normally to be the strongest of his extrovert interests and that this interest also tends normally to be constructive, i.e., to promote the realization of human potentialities as understood by the individual concerned; and we see that the nature and situation of man's life are such that this constructive interest in the well-being of those around him is so inevitable

and basic that the personality will be subject to serious internal strain unless this extrovert interest is strong enough to predominate on the whole and in the long run over other extrovert motives. We can see, too, that only if this is the case will he be able to maintain predominantly harmonious relations with his fellows.

We have also seen, however, that the introvert or self-regarding motives also inevitably acquire great strength, but that they tend to be self-defeating unless they can be checked by some, even stronger, extrovert motives. Putting these two facts together we see that wholesome or well-integrated development of personality requires that the constructive, or benevolent, interest in human beings in general must be the strongest motive in the personality. It means that when egoistic interests or specialized interests in other objects are seen to conflict with conditions of human welfare, so that to gratify them would result in a net decrease in human well-being, then the constructive interest in human beings must be strong enough to hold such impulses in check. Otherwise, whatever the effect on the social relations of the person concerned (and it will usually be bad) the effect upon the integrity of the structure of his own personality as an organized system of interests will be disintegrating or disruptive. It can therefore be laid down as a requirement for the integrated development of personality (as a norm or condition of natural perfection) that an individual's concern for the welfare of another human being should be as strong as his concern for his own. Thus, from the ideal of natural perfection we are able to deduce the basic ethical norm expressed in the Hebrew-Christian principle of love to one's neighbor, in the utilitarian formula of

the greatest happiness of the greatest number, in the Kantian conception of the kingdom of ends, in the Golden Rule, and in many other forms.

The Place of Conscience in the Moral Life

With the help of modern psychological knowledge, derived from studies of problems of personality and its disorders, we have developed a naturalistic justification of the basic moral principle recognized more or less explicitly by all the great moral teachers of mankind. It must be recognized, however, that this is not the way in which these teachers arrived at it, nor is it the reason why it has received such general endorsement. The moral teachers of mankind arrived at it by searching their own peculiarly sensitive consciences. And the principle came to be endorsed by their less sensitive followers because they, reflecting on the teaching of the great moralists, and unwilling at first to accept it, found that the more they thought about it the more their own consciences came to endorse it.

What is this thing called conscience with which the moralists and their followers are concerned? Superficially, it is the set of ideas we hold as to what is right and wrong; and it is the feeling of guilt which tends to arise when we believe we have done something wrong, and the emotions of approval and disapproval with which we regard the actions of others. And every person begins by adopting from others his views as to what is right and wrong. But this is not the whole story. We do not always rest content with what we have been taught to regard as right and wrong. We criticize the form of conscience that has been im-

posed upon us by social conditioning; we ask, Is it *really* right? And we do this *conscientiously*, believing it is right to question whether a rule is right.

When we ask what is this *critical* conscience we have penetrated below the superficial level to the fundamental problem. Why does a man question what he has been taught to believe is wrong? He does so because the rule conflicts with something he believes is right. He is made to think about the conflicting principles. He cannot decide the question by referring to another authority, for it is the authority that is being called in question. He has no final court beyond the conflict within his own volitional life. The conflict is not one between two desires, either one of which could be accepted into his personality as a whole if it were not for the strength of the other. The act he now condemns as wrong is one whose motive he can no longer accept into his personality as a whole. He may desire to do it, but the integrity of his personality rejects it. If he does it he cannot give his whole heart to it; it revolts him and disintegrates him and distresses him with what we call the sense of guilt. He searches its meaning and consequences and tries to excuse it; but if he finds that the better he understands it the more clearly incompatible it is with the integrity of his volitional life then his conviction grows that it is wrong.

We see, then, that when the sages, the ethical teachers of mankind, proclaimed what was to them the new doctrine that a man should love his neighbor as himself what they meant was that they had found that to do otherwise (to choose one's own welfare at the cost of the greater good of others) created in them

a felt condition of disintegrity which their best understanding of the situation served only to fix more firmly. They did not understand the reasons for this and attributed the experience directly to God. Our psychological analysis of the conditions of the natural perfection of personality has shown us the reason why. They felt the inner strain of the conflict within the structure of their volitional life and diagnosed it correctly as a basic disorder, or disintegrity, destructive of the true wholeness, or health, of the self. They felt and diagnosed what was wrong, the unrighteousness, as Plato put it, as a sickness of the soul.

This conflict is one that everyone *tends* to feel when he faces a situation in which he desires to do something that he knows would bring a definitely greater injury to others than any compensating benefit to himself. If, in such a situation, a person does not feel the conflict it is because emotional factors, conscious or unconscious, blind him to it. Egoistic interests and group prejudices also tend to make us ignore the sense of wrong in such actions, and follow our own desires in spite of it, if we do feel it. But the moral teachers whose ethical genius and earnestness first called attention to this particular constraint of conscience, and who generalized the moral principle to which it points, have been able to press their insight upon the rest of mankind to the extent at least of securing a grudging theoretical recognition of it. This they were able to do only because it is a *common* element in human experience, and one which the rest of us tend, rather unwillingly, to recognize when it is pointed out to us.

The basic principle of the moral life is, then, that which

requires us to exercise an impartial concern for the welfare of all. This is the basic *objective* rule of moral conduct and is generally endorsed by the critical conscience at its clearest and most enlightened. There is also, however, a *subjective* principle which is, in its own way, of equal importance. This is the principle of *conscientiousness,* the requirement that one should think for oneself and follow one's own convictions as to what is right. Moralists have emphasized this as the duty to *do* what one believes one *ought* to do, to be true to one's own convictions. We cannot always know what is objectively right. Some may honestly doubt even whether the principle of love to neighbors is valid in all circumstances, or they may be unsure as to its implications. But the principle of loyalty to one's own conscience requires that each should do his best to think for himself what is right, and act upon his own convictions. Such conduct is commonly recognized by moralists to be at least *subjectively* right, even if further information or clearer moral insight should later show it to be *objectively* wrong. This principle also we can see to be justified by our criterion of the natural perfection of personality, for personal development requires that we think for ourselves, and personal integrity requires that we do what we think we ought to do. Only so can habits of resolute purpose and strength of character be developed and maintained.

Specific Principles and the Social Order

One further question should be briefly answered before we conclude. It concerns the difficulty commonly recognized as required to be faced by any ethics which states its basic principle teleologically, as the duty to pursue a certain end, as good.

We are asked: Does the end justify the means? The answer is: Yes, but not *any* means, and that clear recognition of specific rights and duties, and rigid adherence to them, is an essential means to the good end. Some rights are of such vital importance to human welfare that more harm than good is done if we *recognize* that they may ever be legitimately violated for promotion of any good without the consent of the possessor of that right. Such are a man's right to his life, and bodily freedom, and good name. Yet even these rights cannot be held to be absolute in themselves. Anyone of them may sometimes conflict with another. Then we must call in the basic ethical principle to decide the issue. We are faced with a choice of evils. In such a situation, in accord with the principle of an impartial concern for human welfare, we must, of these two evils choose the least.

The basic ethical principle, however, has more positive import than this. It is the moral ground for the effort to mold a social order in which the ideal of the full and free development of personality can best be realized. Such a society, it is clear, must respect the dignity of man; it must insist upon the freedom of the individual within the limits of his moral responsibilities; it must clearly formulate and uphold the rights and duties of each person; it must guarantee to all the opportunity to live a full life within the meaning of the existing culture.

The development and maintenance of a society such as this is the true end at which moral activity aims. Such activity is moral because in it alone does personality maintain its ideal form, the form in which its potentialities are most fully realized. It is also in such activity that the truest happiness is found. But the

paradoxical secret of the moral life is this, that no man can realize this ideal form of self, or the happiness that goes with it, by making it the end he pursues in and for himself. That is the way of self-defeating spiritual pride and restless discontent. But the ideal moral form, and the happiness that goes with it, grow within him, of themselves, in so far as he devotes himself, wholeheartedly, to creating the conditions wherein they may best be realized by others.

Conclusion

The outcome of this discussion is to show that the basic moral principles of the Hebrew-Christian tradition can be supported by the methods of naturalistic ethical inquiry. Religion arrived at these principles by the insight of the seers achieved in personal moral struggle. They have been endorsed by a growing consensus of the moral evaluations of mankind. And they have here been shown to be implied by the known facts of the structure and growth of personality. The principles of impartial concern for human welfare and of faithfulness to the convictions of the critically intelligent conscience have been shown to be norms required for attainment and maintenance of the ideal of the natural perfection of personality. This has brought together the two forms of ethical theory which have hitherto been held in highest regard by the proponents of naturalistic ethics—utilitarianism and the self-realization theory. It has shown that utilitarianism (in its non-hedonistic form) has correctly pointed to the *end* at which ethically right conduct must aim, while the self-realization theory has correctly stated the

ground or *reason* why conduct aiming at that end is ethically required.

But not only have the two most-favored forms of naturalistic ethics been brought together in this solution of the ethical problem. Intuitionism has also been justified. We have seen how persons of sufficient moral earnestness and sensitive ethical insight can penetrate the confusions of traditional moral codes and the conflicts of experienced values, can feel the constraining influence of the basic requirement for their own spiritual integrity and growth, and thus state its essential principle as the fundamental objective norm of the moral life—the principle of impartial concern for human welfare. We have seen, too, how difficult this insight is to grasp clearly in all its generality, and yet how clear it usually is in specific instances. We thus see the reason for the wide measure of intuitive agreement on common moral rules, the difficulty of special cases, and the slow and grudging recognition of the broad reach of the general principle. We see why moral teaching begins with the intuitively based assertion and acceptance of a few simple laws and finds such difficulty in trying to unify them in general principles. Yet we see how genius and moral devotion have overcome these difficulties and ethical intuition has attained a depth of conviction to which philosophy failed to give support because it lacked the necessary psychological knowledge. Thus intuitionism and naturalism in ethics have been justified and their errors explained.

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